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ABSTRACT 
The North Korea nuclear crisis needs to be understood comprehensively, taking 
into account both international relations and the domestic political dynamics of the 
countries involved. Thus, this thesis analyzes North Korean and U.S. policies by 
examining their policies in the two nuclear crises (1993-94) and (2002-present) and 
proposing an improved option for reaching a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. 
This thesis finds that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons with a unique 
historical, cultural, political background-based strategy as a security mechanism and as a 
diplomatic tool to help overcome its economic difficulties. Recently it has shown a 
somewhat more predictable policy toward nuclear issues. In terms of U.S. responses to 
North Korea’s nuclear program, the Clinton administration attempted to modify North 
Korea’s bad behavior with engagement. By contrast, the Bush administration tried to 
change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-line approach. But, since North 
Korea’s explosive test in October 2006, the United States has engaged again positively 
with North Korea. The best option to achievement of North Korean denuclearization is to 
apply multilateral and integrated threat reduction programs in North Korea in a 
comprehensive manner with responsibility shared by all of the partners in the current Six-
Party Talks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis will analyze the interactions between the United States and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) over North Korea’s nuclear program 
since the end of the Cold War in order to clarify a set of issues that have thus far defied 
resolution. It will first assess Pyongyang’s intentions regarding its nuclear program in 
light of North Korea’s security concerns and in reaction to the approaches of successive 
U.S. administrations. Second, it will evaluate American efforts to deal with the North 
Korean nuclear program. Finally, this thesis will assess prospects for a successful 
negotiation of the nuclear issue and for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and 
in Northeast Asia.   
B. IMPORTANT 
The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most troublesome, unstable and 
dangerous regions in the world. Along with Afghanistan and the Middle East, Korea is 
one of the most confrontational places in the post-Cold War world, and it will remain a 
source of problems for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s nuclear program is a major 
contributor to the instability of the entire region, and it remains the focus of prolonged 
efforts by the United States and the international community to contain it. 
North Korea’s status as an established nuclear power could be a trigger for the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere in Northeast Asia (Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and Taiwan), arms races, and conflicts, thus, which depend on the successful 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Indeed, the resolution of the crisis could be 
an opportunity to improve security conditions in Northeast Asia and finally move beyond 
the Cold War in Asia.  
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Consequently, this thesis will make a contribution to the academic and political 
debates on the North Korean nuclear crisis by attempting to develop an improved policy 
option for solving the North Korean nuclear problem and achieving stability, peace, and 
cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This rest of this chapter will focus on reviewing interpretations of U.S. and North 
Korean nuclear negotiating strategy and behavior toward one another.  William Zartman 
argues that negotiation has three components: actors, structure and process, and values.1  
An analysis of actors raises the matter of culture. Commonly, it is assumed that 
negotiators from different cultures negotiate in different ways.  Also, different cultural 
actors may deploy different negotiating behavior.  However, interactions between actors 
may produce change. A structural perspective that considers the distribution of power and 
interactions is more comprehensive than an explanation that analyzes only an actor’s 
preferred behavior.  
Negotiators bargain to achieve their specific goals, but they also negotiate within 
the constraints of larger goals. 2  Peter Berton identifies six critical variables in the 
negotiation process: the distribution of power, the issues to be negotiated, the type of 
relationship between the negotiating parties, the past record of negotiations, the place of 
negotiations, and the personalities of the negotiators.3  
In December 2002, the United States Institute of Peace issued a special report, 
U.S. Negotiating Behavior. The report notes that four factors allow us to explain 
negotiating behavior on any given occasion. 
 
                                                 
1 William Zartman, “Introduction,” in Peter Berton, Hiroshi Kimura, and William Zartman, eds., 
International Negotiation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 2. 
2 Ibid., 3-5. 
3 Peter Berton, “Japanese, Chinese, and Soviet/Russian Negotiators: An Analytic Framework,” in 
International Negotiation, ed. Peter Berton, Hiroshi Kimura, and William Zartman (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), 93-94.  
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• Structural factors, such as a country’s geopolitical situation and its 
political system 
• The national culture of the negotiators, which shapes conceptions of 
conflict and negotiation, patterns of communication, attitude toward time, 
the use of language, and the role of the media 
• The specific issues being negotiated 
• The personalities of negotiators4 
The report argues that recent U.S. negotiators have adopted a distinctive style: forceful, 
explicit, legalistic, urgent, and results-oriented.5 
Scott Snyder, in his book, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating 
Behavior, reveals patterns in North Korea’s negotiating style that North Korea used 
brinkmanship tactics, threats, and crisis escalation diplomacy during the first North Korea 
nuclear crisis.6 In terms of the origin of North Korean brinkmanship tactics, he explains 
that it has historic roots in the DPRK’s guerrilla experience in battle with Japanese armed 
forces during the colonial period and the second World War, explaining:    
The guerrilla partisan experience, through which leaders felt 
unconstrained by norms that might limit options of full-fledged members 
of the international community, has had direct application to and influence 
on North Korean preferences for crisis diplomacy and brinkmanship to 
gain the attention and respect of negotiating counterparts.7 
Also, Snyder argues that the same pattern of North Korean behavior has been 
shown as well in North Korean public statements by spokesmen of the foreign ministry 
have played an important role in underlining solutions that could make the North Korean 
position advantageous in the nuclear negotiation.8 Additionally, since the beginning of 
the Six-Party Talks on August 27, 2003, the circumstances of the nuclear negotiations 
                                                 
4 Special report of United States Institute of Peace on October 2002, “U.S. Negotiating Behavior,” 
www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr94.htm (accessed April 2, 2008).   
5 Ibid. 
6 Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 66-99.  
7 Ibid., 144. 
8 Scott Snyder, “U.S-North Korean Negotiating Behavior and the Six-Party Talks,” in North Korea’s 
Second Nuclear Crisis and Northeast Asian Security, ed. Seung-Ho Joo and Tae-Hwan Kwak (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2007), 160. 
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have turned into multilateral approach.  These multilateral negotiations have limited the 
ability of North Korean negotiators to effectively use crisis escalation or brinkmanship 
tactics.9 
During the first North Korean nuclear crisis negotiations between the United 
States and North Korea in 1993-1994 in Geneva, the North Korean negotiator attempted 
to force the U.S. negotiator to choose between only two options: either unveiling the 
North Korean’s nuclear past or dismantling its present activities. Also, Robert Gallucci 
stated that Kang Sok Ju, the chief negotiator of North Korea showed no flexibility and 
used hard-line tactics in 1993, mentioning Kang’s remarks that “If the United States just 
only interested in North Korea’s nuclear past, Pyongyang would be happy to cooperate 
with the IAEA immediately.”10 North Korea negotiators divided issues into pieces and 
made use of each piece. 
The main reason the North Korean negotiators adopted a pattern of tough 
behavior at the negotiating table is because the stakes were very high. But, if the 
negotiations failed, the consequences were unacceptable to their counterparts. Thus, in 
the nuclear negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang in Geneva, there were 
strategies of mutual brinkmanship. “North Korean had drawn a red line over UN 
sanctions for which is said it was prepared to go to war, United States had drawn a clear 
red line over North Korean reprocessing, which it, likewise, was prepared to go to 
war.”11       
Yong-Sup Han, professor at the Korean National Defense University and a 
visiting fellow at the RAND Corporation during 1999-2000, argues that North Korean 
negotiators employed varied diplomatic tactics to achieve its goals in the first crisis. He 
says that North Korea did not use the brinkmanship tactics in the negotiations with South 
Korea, which commonly were used by North Korean negotiators with the United States. 
                                                 
9 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 147. 
10 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 300. 
11 Charles L. Pritchard, “North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship Testing the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime,” Presented at the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group Conference November 16, 2003, 1-2, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/pritchard20031116.pdf (accessed April 2, 2008). 
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Therefore, he suggests that the United States should consider a balanced carrot and stick 
approach to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis. Such an approach requires more 
knowledge and understanding of the internal dynamics of the two Koreans.12         
According to Chuck Downs’s argument in his book, Over the Line: North 
Korea’s Negotiating Strategy, North Korea’s strategy is extraordinary—irrational, 
unpredictable, and unreasonable—because it is formed by the character of the Pyongyang 
regime and rooted in its unique circumstances and worldview. He points out that for the 
United States and the Republic of Korea, the negotiations with North Korea have been 
aimed at peace on the Korean Peninsula and charitable motivation toward a cruel and 
belligerent regime. But, for North Korea, it was negotiating for its very survival.13  
Additionally, Jasper Becker in his book, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the 
Looming Threat of North Korea, states that Pyongyang achieved its goals by the 
deployment of brinkmanship: 
The brinkmanship used during this first crisis also allowed Pyongyang to 
achieve a number of other objectives, such as entering into direct talks 
with the United States for the first time. … North Korea also opened up 
ties with its old enemy Japan and received the first offer of reparations. 
Lastly, there were strategic gains. Washington did remove its nuclear 
weapons from South Korea and it temporarily suspended the U.S.-South 
Korean annual “Team Spirit” military exercises. It looked like, as with the 
Soviet Union, nuclear arms reduction talks could turn into a stage for 
exploring new relationships.14 
North Korea’s strategy toward nuclear weapons can also be understood by 
analyzing its October 9, 2006 nuclear test. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report for Congress of October 24, 2006 in surveying North Korea’s possible 
motivations, states that “determining the motivations of a government as opaque and 
secretive as North Korea is exceedingly difficult, but analysts have put forth a range of 
                                                 
12 Yong-Sup Han, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations,” The Nonproliferation Review, 7, 
no. 1 (Spring 2000): 49-53. 
13 Chuck Down, Over the Line: North Korea’s Negotiating Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The AEI 
Press, 1999), 280-281.  
14 Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 183. 
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possibilities to explain why the Pyongyang regime decided to test a nuclear weapon.”15 
As with many foreign policy decisions, it says, Pyongyang’s calculations probably reflect 
a combination of factors.16 
• An attempt to secure bilateral talks 
• An attempt to ensure security of the regime 
• Domestic political factors 
• Technical motivations 
The report also enumerated possible medium and long-term implications of Pyongyang’s 
development of nuclear weapons.17 
• Growing nuclear threats to the region 
• A nuclear arms race in Asia 
• Proliferation to other states or non-state actors 
• Likely impact on other proliferators 
• The uncertain fate of Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal in a North Korean 
Collapse Scenario 
Graham T. Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans under 
President Clinton, made the gloomy prediction that a domino effect of nuclear 
proliferation would take place in Northeast Asia by 2010.18 In other words, debates on 
nuclear deterrence and its effects have been getting more complicated.  
North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program has been the focus of U.S. 
policy toward the second North Korean nuclear crisis since James Kelly’s visit to 
Pyongyang on October 2002; did North Korea cheat or did the Bush administration raise 
an inconvenient and possibly irrelevant concern?  
Selig S. Harrison asserts that the Bush administration’s accusation regarding the 
uranium program should not have been used to terminate the 1994 Agreed Framework, 
                                                 
15 Emma Chanlett Avery, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options,” 
CRS Report for Congress, October 24, 2006, 5. 
16 Avery, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” 5. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Graham Allison, “The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation (Op-Ed),” Los Angeles Times, February 17, 
2005. 
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given the small scale and the serious financial and technical difficulties of the North 
Korean HEU program.19  In contrast, Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert Gallucci argue that 
North Korean might have overcome these obstacles through the nuclear smuggling 
network of Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, which provided North Korea with 
prototypes and blueprints for its centrifuge enrichment program.20 
On February 13, 2007, the Agreement on the Six-Party Talks was made between 
the United States and North Korea. It called for dismantling the 1994 Agreed Framework, 
denuclearization, removing the DPRK from the terrorism sponsor country list, and lifting 
economic sanctions. But, many factors make the relationship between the two countries 
difficult.  Daniel Pinkston and Leonard Spector also argue that HEU program has become 
a major obstacle in attempts to implement the February 13 Six-Party Agreement; they 
introduce additional evidence of the DPRK HEU program and a senior U.S. intelligence 
official’s public testimony asserting a continued North Korean HEU effort.21    
Amid debate over the North Korean HEU program and its plutonium bomb test 
on October 9, 2006, Daniel Pinkston and Shin Sungtack argue that additional nuclear 
tests are likely expected to maximize its nuclear deterrent.22  So far, the Pyongyang 
regime has not conducted a second test, so that North Korea’s nuclear strategy remains 





                                                 
19 Selig S. Harrison, “Did North Korea Cheat?” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005). 
20 Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert Gallucci, “Red-handed,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2005). 
21 Daniel Pinkston and Leonard S. Spector, “Six-Parties Adopt Steps for North Korean 
Denuclearization but Uranium Enrichment Controversy Looms as Major Obstacle,” 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/wmdi070403c.htm (accessed March 17, 2008). 
22 Daniel Pinkston and Shin Sungtack, “North Korea Likely to Conduct Second Nuclear Test,” 
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/070108.pdf (accessed March 17, 2008). 
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A recent study by North Korean expert David Kang points out three obstacles to 
managing the North Korea nuclear problem: political issues related to dealing with North 
Korea; the costs and controversy involved in disabling nuclear programs; and legislative 
obstacles to lifting sanctions from North Korea.23 He presents a gloomy set of prospects 
and notes pitfalls that will be difficult to resolve.    
According to Bruce Cumings’ argument, the Bush administration’s policy toward 
the North Korean nuclear crisis has failed because it destroyed the 1994 Agreed 
Framework’s successful eight-year freeze.  He also notes that the Agreed Framework did 
not include the North Korean HEU program. In regard to this, he suggests that 
Washington should make an effort to restore trust and confidence with South Korea, 
which declined during the escalating crisis with North Korea, and to normalize relations 
with North Korea to achieve a formal peace in Northeast Asia.24   
When it come to the solutions for the North Korea nuclear confrontation between 
Washington and Pyongyang, James Clay Moltz and Kenneth Quinones emphasize 
multilateral institutions and forums, including the key regional powers—South Korea, 
China, Russia, and Japan.25 They additionally argue that consensus among the non-
DPRK partners of Six-Party Talks is necessary to achieve “Washington’s goal of a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through a peaceful diplomatic solution.”26 
Overall, the literature on the North Korea nuclear issue needs to be understood 
comprehensively: involving international politics and relations, international institutions, 
nuclear strategy, and the internal political dynamics of the countries involved. Thus, the 
North Korea nuclear crisis is an aggregate of several major issues in world politics.  
 
                                                 
23 David C. Kang, “The Next Nuclear Agreement with North Korea: Prospects and Pitfalls,” The 
National Committee on North Korea and AAAS, October 29, 2007, http://www.ncnk.org (accessed 
February 6, 2008). 
24 Bruce Cumings, “North Korea: Neutral Instead of Nuclear,” Le Monde Diplomatique, October 3, 
2007, Http://mondediplo.com/2007/10/03korea (accessed April 2, 2008).  
25 James Clay Moltz and C. Kenneth Quinones, “Getting Serious about a Multilateral Approach to 
North Korea,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2004): 136. 
26 Ibid., 136, 143. 
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Given these complicated prospects over Korean Peninsula nuclear issues, this 
thesis assesses North Korean and U.S. policies toward the nuclear crisis by analyzing 
their nuclear negotiation strategies and behavior in the first and second North Korea 
nuclear crises. 
Finally, this thesis suggests an improved policy option to settle the North Korea 
nuclear problem and further to enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and 
in Northeast Asia.    
D. METHODOLOGY  
As noted above, this thesis analyzes the interactions between the United States 
and North Korea regarding nuclear issues since the end of Cold War, surveys options for 
solving this lingering problem, and finally suggests the best approach to achieving a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and stabilizing Northeast Asia. 
To accomplish these objectives, the thesis first explores the Pyongyang regime’s 
identity, its intentions for its nuclear program in light of North Korea’s security concerns, 
and its negotiation strategies and behavior in nuclear talks with United States since the 
end of the Cold War.  Second, it evaluates U.S. responses to the North Korean nuclear 
program and U.S. negotiation strategies and behavior in nuclear talks with North Korea.  
Based on an analysis of the U.S. responses to the North Korean nuclear program during 
the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis and multilateral negotiations after the 
nuclear explosion test on October 9, 2006, the thesis evaluates both countries’ approaches 
and explores policy options to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. 
 10
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II. NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR POLICY AND RESPONSES TO 
U.S. POLICY  
A. INTRODUCTION  
North Korean negotiators’ behavior is often described as “unconventional”27or 
“full of stubbornness, brinkmanship, [and] rhetoric”28 by American negotiators.  During 
the second North Korean nuclear crisis, these descriptions were repeated by the Bush 
administration and resulted in a hard-line policy toward Pyongyang.  
However, North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was a turning point that affected 
both U.S. and North Korean tactics and behavior in the Six-Party Talks that are the 
primary channel for negotiating on the North Korean nuclear issue.29 
This chapter examines North Korea’s nuclear policy. Specifically, two questions 
will be covered: What unique factors have shaped North Korea’s negotiating behavior? 
And what strategy have North Korean negotiators employed at the nuclear negotiating 
table with the United States?  
The history of North Korea’s nuclear program is neither short nor simple. It began 
in the 1950s and its acceleration is closely related to the country’s security concerns and 
the economic failure in the 1970s through 1990s. The Pyongyang regime has recently 
pursued nuclear weapons to overcome its challenges by “proliferation through 
negotiation.”30 In other words, North Korea has perceived its nuclear weapons as both a 
defensive military tool and a bargaining chip.      
With regards to negotiating tactics, North Korean negotiators have deployed 
unilateral and brinkmanship behavior with the United States because of North Korea’s 
unique cultural background and unfavorable external factors. Also, after the 2006 
                                                 
27 Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (London: Lynne Reinner, 2002). 
28 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 55.   
29 Snyder, “U.S.-North Korean Negotiating Behavior and the Six-Party Talks,” 151. 
30 Soo Ho Lim, “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation: North Korea’s Nuclear 
Policy and Crisis Diplomacy (1989-2006)” (PhD diss., University of Seoul, 2006), 30.  
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explosive test, the regime faced limitation on its nuclear negotiating behavior, after 
recognizing that its behavior needed to demonstrate less brinkmanship and more 
predictability.    
B. WHAT MAKES NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR 
DIFFERENT? 
1. History 
Negotiations to resolve conflicts and crises have been shaped by traditional 
Korean hierarchical style. These historical patterns are shared by the two Koreas, even 
though they now have totally different political and economic systems.31  The Korean 
dynasty’s hierarchical order was reinforced by the Confucian concept of virtue, which 
justified privilege, landowning, and the intellectual elite’s superiority over the masses, 
who had no hope of social advantage or opportunity for financial gain.32 In general, 
negotiations were shaped by such hierarchical relationships and the associated social 
expectations.33 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Korea’s weakened international position 
allowed China, Japan, and Russia to compete for hegemony on the Korean Peninsula. 
Korea’s geopolitical context is described by the old Korean saying that Korea is as “a 
shrimp among whales.”  These geopolitical traditions have shaped Korean identity and 
attitudes toward foreign policy and negotiation with other countries.  To identify North 
Korean negotiators’ style, it is necessary to understand North Korea’s unique history.  
Major influences on the North Korean socialization process include traditional 
experiences and new elements that are part of the DPRK’s process of state formation: 
especially the role of the partisan guerrilla tradition in shaping the modern DPRK.  
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Kim Il Sung was a partisan guerrilla leader who fought against the Japanese 
colonists in Manchuria and later became the leader of a special Korean unit in the Soviet 
military during World War II.34 His guerrilla experience was eulogized for political 
purposes and his guerrilla days had a strong influence on North Korean leadership style 
and approach to political power. Arguably, the origin of Kim’s guerrilla experience is 
exaggerated in North Korea’s distorted historical record.35  Since its founding, North 
Korea’s political position has never been favorable, a fact that supports its use of guerrilla 
tactics in negotiations. An example is the belief that whatever the difficulties faced by the 
guerrilla troops, they should seek to survive, as survival will lead to eventual victory.36 
North Korean brinkmanship tactics and policy of challenging the conventional order thus 
originates from Kim Il Sung’s partisan guerrilla tradition against Japanese colonial rule.  
Kim Il Sung used guerrilla tactics not only to wage warfare against Japanese 
troops but also to rule the state. Cumings tracks the influence of the guerrilla experience 
on the management of the state from as early as 1946, in documents by Kim Il Sung’s 
official biographer claiming that “the officer [Kim] went on to recommend the guerrilla 
track as a good principle for party and mass organizations.”37 The Pyongyang regime has 
essentially applied “a divide and survive” strategy to deal with external threats, including 
South Korea and the United States.38 North Korean guerrilla tactics are demonstrated in 
their management of the crisis years, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and 
the Rangoon bombing in 1983.39 
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2. Culture 
During the Japanese colonial period (1910-45), Japanese imperialists attempted to 
force Koreans to adopt the Japanese language and culture. Many significant Korean 
artifacts were either stolen or burned by Japan.  As a Korean nationalist and guerrilla 
fighter, Kim Il Sung established several objectives, including Korea’s liberation at the 
end of World War II. Kim also wanted to remove the negative influences of the Japanese 
colonial dictatorship.40 The Japan government arguably became the third favorite target 
of North Korean propagandists after the war, and the Pyongyang regime has been 
concerned primarily with Japan’s remilitarization.  
The result of the Japanese colonial experience is that North Korean negotiators 
remain sensitive to perceived threats to the nation’s sovereignty. Like Chinese negotiators, 
North Korean negotiators strongly emphasize the principles of noninterference with 
internal affairs and state sovereignty.41  
Kim Il Sung took advantage of the combined legacy of the Japanese colonial 
experience and Stalinist structures he learned while living in the Soviet Far East to 
manage society; at the same time, Kim and his successor and son, Kim Jong Il, used 
Korean traditionalism, Confucian norms, and expressions of loyalty and filial piety as 
themes.  
Confucianism was adopted by the Korean Yi dynasty as a central ideology for 
ordering social relations and patriarchal family relationships. Social position determined 
one’s role in the social order, and challenges to the balanced social order were punished 
strictly.42 Confucian traditions were manipulated by Kim Il Sung in founding the state as 
a “family” with himself as the patriarchic leader.  In this context, Kim Il Sung honored 
his own pantheon, including his revolutionary father Kim Hyong Jik and even his 
grandfather, believed to be the commander of troops that had fought against the USS 
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General Sherman.43 When Kim Il Sung died, Kim Jong Il also used Confucian norms to 
gain power and to deal with challenges to his authority by declaring a three-year national 
mourning period.44  
The hierarchical structure of Confucianism is an important factor for 
characterizing North Korean behavior within the international community. North Korean 
negotiators emphasize unconditioned adherence to and protection of their own principles 
in negotiations.45  
In addition, “Juche” 46  ideology asserts Korea’s cultural distinctiveness and 
creativity as well as the productive powers of the working masses. Juche ideology has 
influenced North Korean attitudes toward sovereignty. Although this concept of self-
reliance is not found within Confucian, they may play supplementary roles in 
determining Pyongyang’s foreign policy.47  
3. Politics 
North Korea’s brinkmanship has reinforced the rigidity of the North Korean 
negotiating position.  Edward A. Olsen has analyzed features of “Pyongyang’s 
brinkmanship” under Kim Jong Il as a political and survival tool to deal with economic 
problems and a weak military,48 explaining:  
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Pyongyang’s brinkmanship is not a distracting tactic in a larger war-
fighting strategy. Instead it is an essential element of a strategy designed 
to create two results. The first result is a form of interim deterrence against 
what they perceive as U.S. brinkmanship—the world’s sole superpower 
applying a preemptive doctrine toward a cluster of rogue states and 
terrorists. North Korea’s aggressive policy is designed to compensate for 
their manifest weaknesses and to keep U.S. military capabilities off 
balance. The second goal is to set the stage for external diplomatic and 
economic intervention that will pull the confrontational U.S.-North Korea 
parties away from the brink and act as a catalyst to negotiated 
reunification of North and South Korea.49  
Kim Jong Il adopted a “military-first” 50  policy as a guideline for domestic 
governance and foreign policy. In 1961, Park Chung Hee, a general in the ROK army, 
conducted a bloodless coup, seized power and governed South Korea with a rigid military 
dictatorship. Although political liberties were lost, with the support of former officers he 
fueled South Korean economic development, which planted the seeds for eventual 
democratization. So it is hardly accidental that, Kim Jong Il has begun to talk favorably 
about Park Chung Hee as the biggest contributor to the modernization of the South.51   
Since the Korean War (1950-53), the Pyongyang regime has created a garrison 
state. More than half of its population belongs to the military and military decision-
making structure.52  It is easily to see why North Korean negotiators at the table, rather 
than using concession strategies, under their commander’s direction demonstrate warrior-
like behavior.53  
In terms of its decision-making structure, North Korea’s vertical reporting chain 
and the dictatorial power of the top leaders shorten the distance between negotiators and 
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the top decision maker, thus also making real negotiations more difficult. This kind of 
negotiating structure creates an unfavorable situation insofar as information can flow 
only to the decision maker. Within this structure, North Korea may be using negotiations 
for dual purposes: agenda setting and propaganda.54  
4. Economics 
North Korea Juche or self-reliance policy emphasizes self-sufficiency and 
isolation from external economic factors. North Korean economics have followed Juche 
since the 1950s.55    
The Juche-based economic structure has restricted international trade and 
economic independence, discouraged direct investment from abroad, and emphasized 
core industries,  mostly heavy manufacturing.  Kim Jong Il persists in arguing that the 
country can be strong country ideologically and economically only when its military is 
strong.  In recent years, non-military industries have almost collapsed due to the cost of 
supporting the military.56 
In the late 1980s, when Russia’s subsidies to North Korea were cut off by Soviet 
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the North Korean economy began to decline.57 
During the 1990s, survival for most of the North Korean population depended on 
assistance from outside of the regime. In the meantime, North Korea’s centralized 
economy promoted state-owned heavy industries along with high military spending at 
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economic crisis. North Korea’s economic crisis seems to have been temporally solved, 
but its economy is still severely dependent on external aid to relieve famine among a 
large proportion of its people.58 
North Korea’s economic difficulties and collapse influenced its negotiating 
behavior. An initial element of North Korean brinkmanship was demands for “unilateral 
concessions”59 in return for their agreement to negotiate. The Pyongyang regime pushed 
its counterparts to secure itself, but also to obtain economic concessions at the negotiating 
table.  For example, North Korea extorted unilateral concessions to receive 150,000 tons 
of rice from South Korea and 500,000 tons from Japan in the summer of 1995; North 
Korea demanded food again 1996 and 1997 in return for participation in a joint briefing 
on the Clinton-Kim proposal for the Four-Party Talks.60  They also used the historic 
leaders’ summit in 2002 between the two Kims [Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il] to extort 
illegal financial payments by Kim Dae Jung to the North Korean regime.61 
5. The Dynasty of Kim 
Although the personality cult of the Kim family in the DPRK may seem 
extraordinary to outsiders, it makes sense when understood as an aspect of Confucianism 
and the tradition of the DPRK.  
As Paul French notes, “The Kim family revolutionary dynasty is more than just 
the father and the son. Kim Il Sung’s ancestors have all been effectively beatified as 
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The personality cult of Kim Il Sung was especially influenced by cultural factors like the 
Japanese colonial experience, the Stalinist cult of personality, the Confucian tradition, 
and Korean’s shamanist culture.63    
The Kim dynasty created a theoretical justification for the succession of power 
from Kim the father to Kim the son.  In 1972, when North Korea informally nominated 
Kim Jung Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jung Il was called the “Center of the 
Party.” By this time he became the “Dear Leader,” then the “Guiding Leader” 
(Ryongdoja) in 1983. The following year he was called the “Unprecedented Great Man,” 
and later, in 1997, “Great Leader” (Suryong).64 
The Kim family personality cult is strong enough to enforce North Korean 
negotiating patterns. For example, if foreign negotiators were to insult the Great Leader, 
Kim Il Sung, within or outside of the negotiation, the insult would become a hot button 
issue for North Korean negotiators.65   
C. WHY DOES NORTH KOREA WANT TO POSSESS NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS? 
What interests are states trying to serve when they seek nuclear weapons? 
According to Victor Cha, there are various arguments regarding the DPRK’s intentions 
and the objectives of its nuclear programs. These include defensive military goals 
(nuclear weapons as a shield), offensive military goals (nuclear weapons as a sword), 
diplomatic goals (nuclear programs as a bargaining chip) and diplomatic goals (weapons 
programs serving as a badge).66  
This chapter analyzes the logic and theoretical bases supporting these propositions. 
A neo-realist approach is adopted to explain the motivation of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons. Toward this end, this chapter presents the tenets of this and other forms of so-
                                                 
63 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 38. 
64 Andrew Scobell, “Kim Jong Il and North Korea: the Leader and the System,” March 2006, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub644.pdf (accessed May 24, 2008), 1-8. 
65 Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge, 40. 
66 Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?” Political 
Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (2002). 
 20
called defensive realism and nuclear proliferation. It explains North Korea's nuclear 
weapons development with regards to a security model and defensive realism during the 
Cold War and immediately thereafter. It presents research on North Korea’s nuclear 
policy in relation to defensive realism since the 1970s. The chapter concludes that the 
DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons not only to enhance its security, but also for 
leverage in the service of its bargaining-diplomatic goals, what Lim calls “proliferation 
through negotiation.”67  
1. The Security Model and Defensive Military Goals 
If the USSR establishes general diplomatic relations with South Korea, it 
will make the USSR-DPRK alliance invalid. And the DPRK should make 
a decision to be the self-reliant regarding nuclear weapons policy.68        
a. Neo-realism and the Security Model  
The neo-realist approach and the “security model” are general schools of 
thought explaining nuclear proliferation. Many analyses conclude that the leading 
motivation for nuclear proliferation comes from concerns about security. Additionally, 
because nuclear policy is normally a strategic top secret shared by a few high class elites, 
realism simplifies a state’s objectives to security and thus provides reasonable and 
uncomplicated explanations. This structural theory can clarify and help predict states’ 
behavior with regard to proliferation and non-proliferation.69   
As Waltz argues, the basic status of the international political system to 
which states must adapt are its “anarchic structure”70 and the number of great powers, 
which is determined by the distribution of capabilities. First, because the international 
order is anarchic and the primary goal of states is survival, states cannot help pursuing 
self-help measures.  In other words, states must prepare against threats either by 
                                                 
67 Lim “Existential Deterrence and Proliferation through Negotiation,” 28-29. 
68 Kim Yong-Nam, “This is an Unpleasant Affair for Unification,” Minju Chosun, September 19, 
1990). 
69 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 73. 
70 Ibid., 114. 
 21
increasing their military muscle or through security alliances with other states. 
Incidentally, nuclear weapons, because of their deterrent power, confer prestige on those 
states that possess them. Thus, the anarchic nature of the international system provides 
incentives for nuclear proliferation.71    
Second, in the logic of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities empowers 
both the pursuit of nuclear weapons as well as nonproliferation. All states should be 
among the receivers under the two superpowers’ extended deterrence. The superpowers’ 
extended deterrence commitment was reliable and deterred against nuclear proliferation. 
But one superpower may have believed that the existence of one or more of its allied 
countries did not influence the balance of power. Therefore, that superpower might 
abandon its ally in the face of conflicts involving nuclear weapons threats.72 Proliferation 
or non-proliferation is determined by the tension between these two factors: the 
credibility of extended deterrence, and fear of abandonment to the forces of the anarchic 
order.73 As Scott Sagan says: 
Strong states do what they can: they can pursue a form of internal 
balancing by adopting the costly, but self-reliant, policy of developing 
their own nuclear weapons. Weak states do what they must: they can join 
a balancing alliance with a nuclear power, utilizing a promise of nuclear 
retaliation by that ally as a means of extended deterrence.74 
When the strong states’ strategic interests are low, the weak states’ fear of 
abandonment grows stronger. Even if weak states face technical limitations, nuclear 
technology and facilities have spread since the 1970s, so economic and technical 
problems are no longer insurmountable barriers to those determined to possess nuclear 
weapons.  Because it takes a long time to develop nuclear capability, states suspected of 
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nuclear proliferation face the long-term risk of preventive strikes by the nuclear weapon 
states. Efforts to gain nuclear weapons to survive could boomerang against a regime.75 If 
a regime has reached out for nuclear materials and develops nuclear weapons capability, 
the chance of preventive strike by another country will decrease. Thus, becoming a 
nuclear power is an undeniable temptation for a state that wants nuclear weapons for 
security.76 
What does the end of bipolarity mean for proliferation? Neo-realists 
assume that the end of bipolarity will lead to multipolarity. This could mean abandoning 
the extended deterrence that prevented proliferation during the Cold War. According to 
this argument, worldwide proliferation among multiple large powers is now inevitable. 
Neo-realists also argue that the speed of proliferation will be determined by how quickly 
extended deterrence is withdrawn. 77  However, multipolar structures have not yet 
emerged and an unexpected unipolar structure has been maintained for an extended 
period.78   
International concerns focus on the so-called, “rogue states,” weak 
countries estranged by the unipolar structure. Neo-realist theory argues that countries 
with no resources should try to affect the balance of power by bandwagoning with strong 
countries.79  In reality, the development of nuclear weapons means continued isolation 
from the world community. It is a hard choice for weak countries to survive economically 
in the long run. Therefore, considering security and alternative benefits, giving up nuclear 
options would be a reasonable alternative. In 2003, Libya chose this approach. At the 
time, Libya lacked sufficient nuclear materials to take the first step toward becoming a 
nuclear power, and the Bush administration prevented it from acquiring nuclear materials 
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by enhancing non-proliferation and counter-proliferation activities. By contrast, it was 
not known in 2003 whether the DPRK had sufficient nuclear material and equipment to 
make nuclear weapons.80  If minimum deterrence were to be achieved by possessing 
nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons’ effects needed to be activated as a “strategic 
balancer,” regardless of the capabilities gap. A country with the capability to make 
nuclear weapons, therefore, is normally unwilling to abandon it. Muddling through 
allows a state to make nuclear weapons, and some day to be identified as nuclear state. In 
1998, Pakistan chose this approach. Is the DPRK now attempting to pursue a similar 
course? 
b. Defensive Military Goals  
Waltz argues that the North Korean nuclear program is a military self-help 
policy for survival of the regime. It is unlikely that other states or regimes can prevent 
further North Korean nuclear proliferation. The DPRK wants be a nuclear power because 
the regime feels weak, isolated, and threatened. As the regime becomes more vulnerable, 
nuclear weapons become more desirable.81  Defensive military goals theory argues that 
the imbalance between North and South Korea's economic and conventional military 
forces, and North Korea's isolation, weakened alliances with China and Russia, and 
threats from the United States leaves it with, “no alternatives except the nuclear 
option.”82  
Classical notions of collective security (or diplomacy) stet Military goals 
theory stet that North Korea’s motivation to pursue nuclear weapons comes from its 
external insecurity. The theories differ in that defensive military goal theory argues that 
North Korea’s intentions toward nuclear weapons cannot easily be altered. In other words, 
despite the DPRK regime’s sense of instability, if the United States provides a guarantee 
not to strike, a peace agreement, and a normalized relationship, the DPRK would 
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completely dismantle its nuclear programs and declare what it already have and what it 
has been developing.83 Thus, the military-goal view holds that the DPRK is unwilling to 
abandon its nuclear programs regardless of U.S. policy, because nuclear weapons are 
more dependable than any legal security provided by strong states.84 The military force 
imbalance between the two Koreas may be the main reason for North Korea’s continued 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.  
By contrast, Jervis and Glaser argue that cooperation can be a self-help 
approach in case of geographical separation, superiority of technology, and defensive 
military doctrines.85  But this author believes that these particular factors complicate 
North Korea’s nuclear issues and prevent their resolution. There are no geographical 
barriers between South and North Korea. The barriers preventing identification of North 
Korea’s intentions with its forward-deployed military forces since the mid-1970s are 
South Korean minefields in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and concrete walls. Until 1991, 
the United States deployed small tactical nuclear weapons to deter North Korea’s 
reinvasion of South Korea. Also, since the end of 1990s, U.S. military doctrine toward 
the Korean Peninsula has involved more proactive military actions,86 while in 2005 the 
use of nuclear weapons became simpler under the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear 
Operations.87 
From a defensive military prospective, North Korea clearly needs aid from 
outside.  To get it, it should change its policy toward nuclear weapons. But it is difficult 
for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. The only way for the regime to solve 
both its economic and security problems is to declare denuclearization to the world 
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community, while secretly continuing to develop nuclear weapons. This is why 
Pyongyang gave the international community some relief by allowing International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 1992 and cooperating with the 1994 
Agreed Framework and the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, while at the 
same time continuing to develop its nuclear weapons. North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
policy is like “parasitic extortionism”88 to gain outside aid in order to maintain the 
regime.  
c. The Case of North Korean Proliferation 
(1) The Cold War and “Fear of Abandonment.”  The security 
model says that weak states decide to pursue proliferation or non-proliferation in 
accordance with the credibility of extended deterrence from strong states. The case of 
North Korean proliferation during the Cold War era could be a good illustration of this 
proposition. North Korean nuclear weapons efforts originated not only from the U.S. 
threat, but also from losing the protection of the Soviet Union’s and China’s extended 
deterrence. The dynamics of North Korean nuclear weapons development show a typical 
secondary alliance dilemma.89  
The Soviet Union satisfied its East Asian alliances through 
extended deterrence in the 1950s.90 Following Khrushchev’s struggle for power in the 
early 1960s, his “revisionist” approach identified a peace and coexistence policy with 
capitalism. Khrushchev publicly criticized Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and 
the Communist Party Convention in 1961, and he offended both the Chinese and 
Albanian Communist parties. For North Korea, the Albanian issue was not just a simple 
ideological debate. Kim Il Sung commented that the DPRK should prepare to be 
abandoned by Moscow, as was Albania, and declared a policy of self-reliant survival in 
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1961.91  In other words, North Korea had “fear of abandonment.”  As Pyongyang’s 
dissatisfaction and lack of trust in Moscow increased, the Cuban Missile crisis in October 
1962 led Pyongyang to calculate that Khrushchev had surrendered to the U.S. nuclear 
threat and abandoned Cuba.92  
The DPRK revised its nuclear policy from the pursuit of extended 
deterrence to deterrence by punishment in 1962. At that time, North Korean leaders must 
have decided to develop their own nuclear weapons. In 1963, Pyongyang asked the 
USSR to assist with its nuclear programs, but Moscow turned it down.93 When the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) nuclear test succeeded in 1964, Kim Il Sung stated 
that “this success is self-help against the United States’ nuclear blackmail.” 94   He 
suggested that the two countries share nuclear technology. Mao coldly responded that 
“small countries such as North Korea do not need nuclear weapons.”95 When Khrushchev 
was forced out in 1964, the DPRK again tried to get Soviet nuclear weapons assistance. 
Early efforts to develop nuclear weapons may have been deterred with conventional 
military assistance and more credible extended deterrence from the USSR.    
North Korea’s second experience of abandonment came with the 
1968 Pueblo incident. The DPRK expected Soviet support against the United States’ hard 
line, but Brezhnev pursued the Soviet Union’s interests, noting that the alliance between 
the USSR and DPRK was restricted to defensive concerns. The Soviet reaction again 
provoked North Korea’s fear of abandonment.96   
Facing an enhanced nuclear threat and fear of abandonment, Kim 
Il Sung ordered independent nuclear weapons development in the late 1970s. The DPRK 
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began to build a 5MWe plant at Yongbyun in 1979; the international community also 
began detecting North Korean possible nuclear-design-related conventional explosions at 
weapons testing facilities in 1983.97 Meanwhile, since 1979 Pyongyang has strongly 
proclaimed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  Countries developing nuclear 
weapons have all concealed their programs and taken a public anti-nuclear stance, as can 
been seen in the cases of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s, China in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and India and Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s. North Korea followed the 
same path.98 The international context for DPRK policy included the Soviet opening 
toward the West, the collapse of Eastern Europe’s communist countries, Soviet-South 
Korean diplomatic normalization, the start of U.S.-Chinese military cooperation, and 
Chinese diplomatic approaches to South Korea. Given these developments, the USSR 
and China did not need to use North Korea in their strategic competition. Consequently, 
in 1987 North Korea began to build a reprocessing plant, which became partly 
operational in 1989. Between 1989 and 1991, the regime obtained a plutonium stock by 
separating enough plutonium to make one or two nuclear weapons.99  
(2) Post Cold War and “Proliferation through Negotiation.”  
The security model can explain the case of North Korean nuclear proliferation in the Cold 
War era through the post-alliance dilemma. But the case in the post-Cold War world 
cannot be explained as clearly. The DPRK cooperated with the world community by 
agreeing to the IAEA safeguard agreement in 1992 and Geneva framework in 1994. At 
the same time, it concealed evidence of its past nuclear development and current nuclear 
activities. 
When the United States agreed to a high-level meeting in March 
1993, the DPRK returned to talks on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not as a regular 
member, but withholding secession for special status never officially granted. As talks 
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with the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the IAEA made no progress, the 
DPRK started removing about 8,000 irradiated fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.100 
Thus, the only evidence that could verify the past North Korean nuclear activities 
disappeared, and the DPRK enhanced its nuclear capabilities again. The first nuclear 
crisis that began with the removal of the irradiated fuel rods was resolved with the 1994 
Agreed Framework, but Pyongyang insured its option to develop nuclear weapons again. 
The tactics of partial cooperation and proliferation used by the 
DPRK before the 1994 Agreed Framework were used again. While freezing its plutonium 
program, North Korea developed a secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program101 
and resumed testing of high explosives assumed to work for nuclear-armed warheads.102 
The ambiguous North Korean nuclear weapons strategy continued even though North 
Korean security improved through the Perry and Kim Dae Jung process. 103   The 
Pyongyang regime tested a missile in August 1998; it is believed that the missile test was 
a step toward greater capability to deliver nuclear-armed missiles as well as an 
inducement to the United States to agree with North Korean demands.  
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Figure 1.   North Korean process of Proliferation through negotiations104 
As shown in Figure 1, when the second North Korea nuclear crisis 
occurred, while the DPRK attended the three Six-Party Talks, they also removed around 
8,000 irradiated fuel rods to increase their amount of separated plutonium in 2003 and 
again in 2005. Pyongyang declared that they possessed nuclear weapons in February 
2005. Although the Six-Party Talks on denuclearization and peace on the Korean 
Peninsula made progress in September 2005, the DPRK tested a long-range missile in 
July 2006 and exploded a nuclear device in October 9, 2007, against the United States 
hawk engagement policy.105   
How can one explain the DPRK’s simultaneous partial 
proliferation and cooperation with non-proliferation policy? A desire for ambiguity 
regarding its nuclear capabilities and a passion for the possession of nuclear weapons are 
part of the answer. The lack of transparency is a distinguishing characteristic of the 
second-generation proliferation, as seen in the cases of India, Pakistan, and Israel.106 The 
North Korean case shares this characteristic, but also shows an extraordinary pattern: 
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“proliferation through negotiation.” Many second-generation proliferants (Israel since 
1970, India and Pakistan until 1997, and Iran and Iraq from 1989 to 2002) are, according 
to Etel Solingen, “fence-sitter”107 cases. The DPRK is only the state that noisily moved 
back and forth between proliferation and non-proliferation, pulling out of the NPT in 
2003. By showing a strong passion for nuclear weapons and a strategic decision for non-
proliferation at the same time, the regime confused the international community and, in 
the process, has gradually developed its nuclear capabilities, including missile delivery 
capabilities. 
As defensive realist theory argues, if the DPRK focused only on 
deterrence with nuclear weapons, its policy would be secret proliferation, a neither 
confirm nor deny (NCND) or “fence-sitter” strategy. This theory could not explain why 
North Korea froze its plutonium program from 1994 to 2002. If Pyongyang had not 
frozen its nuclear facilities, North Korea already would have become a nuclear state.108 
Additionally, if the DPRK pursued regime survival with nuclear weapons, the highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) program would not be necessary. North Korea has tried to get 
benefits from nuclear weapons through proliferation and negotiations, which is 
extraordinary behavior in the post-Cold War world.  
2. Rogue States and Offensive Military Goals  
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were generally regarded as a tool not for 
revision, but for status quo by deterrence. Now, in the post-Cold War, the international 
community has raised concerns that regionally ambitious states and terrorist groups will 
use nuclear weapons for revisionary objectives. There is no doubt that the use of nuclear 
weapons by ambitious states and groups would result in their destruction by nuclear 
retaliation from the United States and its alliance. Nevertheless, as Les Aspin, U.S.  
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Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton, said, “In the past, we dealt with the 
nuclear threat from the Soviet Union through a combination of deterrence and arms 
control…. But the new possessors of nuclear weapons may not be deterrable.”109  
This concern stems from the 1991 Gulf War, which held significant lessons for 
United States military strategy. First, the United States must prevent hostile and rogue 
states from possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Gulf War, the 
United States supported harder-line non-proliferation policies, including the IAEA’s 
decision to assert its right to conduct special inspections. Second, to deter adversaries 
from getting WMD, the United States decided it needed surgical counter-force strike 
capabilities and defensive capabilities to secure its homeland and allies against 
adversaries’ remaining nuclear weapons. These counter-proliferation actions were 
believed to be more effective than traditional non-proliferation activities. 
Additionally, the Gulf War provided critical lessons to rogue states with a hostile 
relationship with the United States. First, never challenge the United States’ supremacy 
with conventional armed forces. Iraq could not resist at all, even though Saddam Hussein 
had about a million troops with plenty of battle experience from the Iran-Iraq War, due to 
absolute intelligence and air dominance by the United States. Second, WMD can generate 
the best security guarantee for such a regime. What if Saddam Hussein had nuclear 
weapons and the capability to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Europe, and the United States? 
Would the United States try to expel Iraq from Kuwait without hesitation? What if, as a 
nuclear power, Iran invaded Azerbaijan to seize the Caspian oil fields and threaten the 
United States and Russia with nuclear weapons? How effective and rapid would U.S. 
responses be toward Iran’s aggression?110 What if, as a nuclear power, North Korea 
commits aggression against South Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula and threatens 
South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. homeland with nuclear-armed missiles. In this case, 
would the United States intervene on the Korean Peninsula? If the United States takes 
action, how rapid would it be? How effective? 
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Offensive military goals theorists believe that if North Korea has sufficient 
nuclear weapons and if Kim Jong Il invades the South, South Korean military forces 
would be mentally disarmed, and augmentation forces from the United States would be 
delayed or canceled. In other words, they believe that North Korean nuclear weapons are 
a sword for unifying the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, just as with defensive military 
goals, there is a low probability that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons 
completely. Also, negotiations are among the deception strategies that provide time and 
resources to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, defensive military goals theory 
argues that North Korean abandonment of nuclear programs could be achieved, based on 
the removal of external threats including the threat of a U.S. nuclear attack. Offensive 
theorists believe that if United States withdraws its nuclear attack threat from North 
Korea, it could increase the North's ambition to invade the South.111 
In general, the DPRK’s ultimate national objective is believed to be the 
hegemonic unification of the Korean Peninsula. Some experts claim that North Korea’s 
national objective has changed since the end of Cold War to defensive status quo: to 
prevent unification by absorption into South Korea.112  Some critics argue that because 
the two Koreas’ economic gap will increase, North Korea’s defensive survival strategy 
will likely result in its absorbed unification by South Korea; therefore this is not a long-
term strategy for the DPRK.  If unification is not achieved by military force, South Korea, 
which overwhelms North Korea economically, will lead the unification process by 
economic logic.113  Consequently, analysts argue that trying to unify by armed force 
would be not only a revisionist ambition, but also an inevitable offensive survival 
strategy.114 But, as long as the U.S.-ROK security alliance is successful, any attempt by 
North Korea to unify with conventional forces would be self-destructive.115   
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Offensive military goals theory emerged in the early 1990s. At the time, because 
estimates placed North Korea’s capabilities as only one or two Nagasaki class weapons 
without nuclear warhead technology, the regime did not appear as a military threat. This 
changed after the detection of high-explosive tests and long-range Taepodong-I missiles. 
Experts estimate that after unfreezing its plutonium program in 2003, the North Korean 
arsenal may have increased to about ten plutonium weapons. Also, recently it became 
more plausible to believe that North Korea has delivery technology.116 The DPRK tested 
a long-range Taepodong-II missile on June 4, 2006.117 Were they successful, these tests 
could eventually lead to more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missiles 
within range of U.S. military bases in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. west 
coast.118 However, analysts believe the missile is “fairly inaccurate.”119 
Evaluations by intelligence agencies of the United States and other governments 
of all seven missiles launched on July 4, 2006, reportedly conclude that North Korea 
increased the accuracy of its Scud and Nodong missiles and that the launches displayed 
the ability of North Korea’s command-and-control apparatus to coordinate multiple 
launchings of missiles at diverse targets.120  
Victor Cha argues that U.S. involvement might be deterred even if the regime 
lacks the capability to strike U.S. territory.121 The DPRK invasion could be achieved 
through two denial strategies: delaying U.S. augmentations by persistent chemical and 
biological attacks on South Korean ports and logistics nodes, and deterring U.S. actions 
by holding Japan’s population centers as nuclear hostages. The feasibility of this strategy 
depends not on U.S. and Japanese capitulation, but on the allies’ indecision for a long 
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enough time for North Korean forces to overtake Seoul. If the DPRK takes Seoul, it 
would hold considerable leverage. It might cease hostilities and seek to negotiate from a 
position of strength. Therefore, Cha argues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are critical 
not as part of a defensive existential deterrent doctrine, but as an offensive military 
strategy.122    
3. Diplomatic Goals           
To deter a U.S. response, the DPRK must overcome a critical obstacle, the United 
States Forces Korea (USFK) and ROK troops. The invasion of North Korea differs from 
the Iranian and Iraqi cases. The USFK presence allows automatic involvement of the 
United States in conflicts between the South and North. Therefore, if USFK pulled back 
from South Korea, once a North Korean invasion take place, its deterrent capabilities 
against U.S. intervention would become more probable. For this reason, an argument can 
be made that Pyongyang will use the nuclear card to pull USFK from the Korean 
Peninsula. 
One might argue that Pyongyang is willing to use nuclear-armed missiles as a 
bargaining chip with the United States in peace negotiations. But it becomes clear that 
enhancement of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities could motivate Japan to become a 
nuclear weapons state. However, if the United States withdraws extended deterrence 
from Northeast Asia due to concern about the nuclearization of Japan, U.S. interests will 
be harmed. First, the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear commitment in the Northeast Asia 
and pullback of USFK could conceivably lead to the nuclearization of South Korea 
automatically. Second, if South Korea did become a nuclear power, Japan’s motivation to 
obtain nuclear weapons would dramatically increase.  
In sum, North Korean nuclear strategy is the paradoxical coexistence of nuclear 
proliferation and denuclearization bargaining, in other words, Lim’s “proliferation 
through negotiation.” For Kim Jung Il, nuclear proliferation was a tool for both  
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deterrence and effective bargaining. In the bargaining process, North Korea has tried to 
establish moral justification for its nuclear programs to appeal to the international 
community.  
After the October 2006 nuclear test, the complete denuclearization of North Korea 
seems unlikely. However, it is not reasonable for North Korea to deploy nuclear weapons 
as long as its nuclear policy simultaneously pursues deterrence and coercion against the 
United States. It is expected that North Korea will try to adjust it nuclear capabilities 
through negotiations to a certain level of denuclearization, thus maximizing the benefits 
of possessing nuclear weapons. 
D. NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES AND BEHAVIOR IN NUCLEAR TALKS 
WITH UNITED STATES 
The words brinkmanship, crisis diplomacy, unpredictable, irrational, and crazy 
are frequently used to characterize North Korean negotiating behavior. Despite these 
descriptions, North Korea’s negotiating behavior and patterns have been extraordinarily 
consistent and predictable.123 As Chuck Down argues, “Few nations have so regularly 
practiced negotiation as their principal foreign policy instrument, so a familiar set of 
negotiating tactics, and so doggedly pursued a set of fundamental negotiating 
objectives.”124 
Harold Nicolson categorizes alternative modern diplomatic approaches as these of 
the “warrior” and the “shopkeeper.” The warrior style draws on the military and 
hierarchical approaches, while the shopkeeper style focuses on helping peaceful 
commerce.125  
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Traditionally, North Korean negotiators employed the warrior’s style in talks with 
Western negotiators in the armistice dialogue during the Korean War.126 North Korean 
negotiators chose the warrior pattern because they were affected by the revolutionary 
fervor of anti-imperialism and communism.127  
However, the Pyongyang regime’s negotiating style changed during the first and 
second nuclear crisis. In other words, North Korean negotiators also adopted the position 
of a shopkeeper, 128 seeking a common understanding based upon rationality and 
confidence.129 
1. Drawing the United States into Direct Bilateral Negotiations   
The DPRK’s announcement of its intent to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in March 1993 and its nuclear explosive test in October 2006 induced the United 
States to direct talks.130 In general, a weak state is not in a favorable position to induce a 
strong counterpart to negotiate, and a strong state sets various preconditions that are 
difficult for a weak state to accept.131 
North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT was a desperate response to an 
IAEA special inspection. At the time, the Pyongyang regime faced a dilemma. If the 
IAEA special inspection could not confirm North Korea’s innocence, the North would 
gain nothing.  However, if North Korea was proven to be developing nuclear weapons, it 
would result in more international pressure. Thus, if Pyongyang accepted all special 
inspections by IAEA, it would lose its nuclear weapons and potentially its national 
prestige.132 
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What was the main reason for Pyongyang’ efforts to induce the United States to 
negotiate bilaterally? North Korean negotiators thought that both the ROK and the IAEA 
were “puppets” of the United States, so Washington would be more likely than others to 
compromise. In this context, North Korea’s negotiating pattern focused on extracting 
more concessions from the United States than from the ROK or IAEA.133 
2. Initial Negotiating Stage 
a. An Aggressive Stance 
The initial North Korean attitude in nuclear talks has been described by 
Snyder as “If you don’t accept our proposal, we will walk out,” or “We accept your 
proposal, but you do X first,” a maximum demand for unilateral concession with 
intentions to break a negotiation.134    
An aggressive stance eliminates any possibility that the North Korean 
negotiators can be dominated. In talks with the United States, North Korean delegates 
follow their leadership’s instructions, which stress that negotiation with the United States 
means fighting against “imperialists.”135  As Kim Yong Ho argues, “It certainly serves to 
protect the delegation from charges back home of weakness or deviation from the party 
line.”136 
b. Raising Principles First 
In the initial stages, North Korean negotiators prefer to raise principles 
that both countries can agree upon. This strategy was clearly used during the first and 
second rounds of the U.S.-North Korean high-level talks in 1993.137  At the first round of 
talks in June, North Korea demanded that the United States agree on two principles for 
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future agreements regarding assurance against the threat and use of forces including 
nuclear bombs.138These principles gave North Korea room for a range of potential 
disagreements. North Korea used loopholes in the previous agreement.139 During the two 
countries’ high-level talks in 2000, the Six-Party Talks in 2003-04, and in February 2007, 
Pyongyang insisted on unacceptable details, such as the replacement of the armistice 
treaty with a bilateral peace treaty, U.S. support for North Korea’s unification formula for 
Korean Confederation,140 and removing North Korea from the U.S. list of countries 
supporting terrorism.141  The 1994 Agreed Framework did not contain removal of North 
Korea from the U.S. terrorism list. But during the second round of North Korean nuclear 
tensions, the issue was a major objective of the North Korean negotiating strategy as a 
precondition for denuclearization.  
3. The Middle Negotiating Stage 
a. Demands for High and Unconditional Concessions 
In the middle of negotiating, North Korean negotiators manipulate the 
agenda by demanding strong and unconditional concessions.  This pattern is clearly seen 
when Kim Jong Il escalated the stakes in the nuclear talks with the United States.  Such 
behavior is an effective signal of a maximalist stance. North Korean negotiators 
demanded U.S. assurance of no nuclear threat, abandonment of the joint U.S.-ROK Team 
Spirit exercise, and withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea, all 
demands largely focused on security goals and regime survival.142 
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The response to the pattern of unconditional demands is best illustrated by 
the rice donations from South Korea and Japan in 1995. But North Koreans made no 
concessions in return.143  Having achieved their objective, North Korean negotiators were 
confident that the United States would devote itself to resolving the nuclear crisis.144 As 
time passed, North Korea continuously demanded concessions, including political and 
economic rewards such as diplomatic normalization between the two countries as part of 
the 1994 deal, energy aid, and benefits from dismantling its nuclear weapons program.  
During the Six-Party Talks in February 2007, the North Korean negotiator 
Kim Gye Gwan reportedly demanded energy assistance so strongly that U.S. negotiator 
Christopher Hill warned that demanding too much risked collapse of the entire 
agreement.145 North Korea was provided with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil yearly under 
the Agreed Framework in 1994 and now wanted even greater compensation of 1 million 
tons.   
From the view of most American negotiators, the North Korean behavior 
depicted follows an unrealistically aggressive pattern of bluffing, maximum demands, 
and calls for unilateral concessions. 146  North Korean delegates, in Snyder’s words, 
“always push as far as they think they can go so that the negotiating counterpart may be 
operating at a disadvantage.”147 
b. Distracting Negotiating Issues  
In the middle of nuclear talks, negotiators from Pyongyang have distracted 
their counterparts with new bargaining issues. North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the 
NPT in 1993 created a transition of the core negotiating issue, from the IAEA special  
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inspection to North Korea’s continued membership in the NPT. At the second round of 
high-level talks, supply of the light-water reactor was the main new agenda item at the 
negotiating table.148  
A final example of the tactic of introducing distracting issues is North 
Korea’s use of long-range missile development to preserve a favorable negotiating 
position.149 After Pyongyang agreed to a long-range missile moratorium with the Clinton 
administration, nuclear talks were in a deadlock with the Bush administration. North 
Korea pushed the agenda off-track by testing missiles in July 2006.150 The Pyongyang 
regime induced the United States back to the table to engage in a peaceful diplomatic 
manner, resulting in the agreement of the Six-Party Talks in February 2007. In the end, 
nuclear negotiations between the two countries focused not only on nuclear and military 
issues, but also on political and economic topics like energy aid and diplomatic and 
economic normalization.    
c. Brinkmanship Tactics against U.S. Brinkmanship  
Since the early 1990s, brinkmanship has been cited as the most notorious 
characteristic of North Korean negotiators’ behavior. This negotiating tactic is closely 
related to crisis diplomacy.151 
Charles L. Pritchard argues that “the primary reason Pyongyang is taken 
seriously at the negotiating table is because of its track record for violence and because 
the stakes are usually too high, and the consequences for others (not necessarily the 
negotiators) unacceptable if diplomacy fails.”152  The 1993-94 first crisis was seen as 
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mutual brinkmanship. Pyongyang had drawn a red line, saying that any sanctions would 
be regarded as a declaration of war. Washington also drew a red line over North Korean 
reprocessing, seeing that as a cause to go to war.153      
In other examples, brinkmanship occurred when North Korean negotiators 
asserted that North Korea planned to test nuclear weapons in the Six-Party Talks, as the 
DPRK foreign ministry stated, “bolstering its nuclear deterrent as a self-defense 
measure.”154  Why would North Korea adopt a reckless manner that resulted from being 
included in Bush’s “axis of evil”? 155  Pyongyang’s brinkmanship is not simply a 
distracting behavior, but rather it is an essential strategy to create security and economic 
benefits. Regarding security benefits, Pyongyang wants a deterrent against U.S. 
brinkmanship. They believe that the Bush administration has adopted a preemptive 
doctrine with rogue states and terrorists. Setting the stage for diplomatic and economic 
normalization with the United States is the goal, with the intention of moving the two 
countries away from mutual brinkmanship.156 
d. Crisis Diplomacy 
Crisis diplomacy is a highly effective trait of the North Korean negotiating 
style. It stems from the regime’s internal dynamics, which forces Pyongyang’s line to the 
top of the list of negotiating issues with the United States, and from North Korea’s 
partisan guerrilla history. During the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korean 
negotiators have, whether instinctively, strategically, or unwittingly, employed the tactics 
of crisis diplomacy to get attention and concessions.157  
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The Pyongyang regime reacted to increased external pressure by 
threatening to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993 and by actually withdrawing in 
January 2003, 158  thus escalating the nuclear crisis between the United States and 
DPRK.159     
Other significant examples of crisis diplomacy include North Korea’s 
initiation of the removal spent fuel rods from its five-megawatt reactor in May 1994, 
extraction of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon storage pool in May 2005, missile tests in 
August 1998, May 2005, July 2006, and nuclear explosive testing in October 2006.160  
This style of diplomacy presents a major challenge to U.S. negotiators. However, it does 
not always have good results for Pyongyang, as crisis diplomacy also leads to imposition 
of international sanctions and increased isolation from the external world.161  
E. CONCLUSION 
1. Proliferation through Negotiation 
This chapter has examined what makes North Korean behavior different in the 
international community, why they want nuclear weapons, and what kind of negotiating 
patterns are used by North Korean delegates. The Pyongyang regime has a unique 
historical background and has continuously faced an unfavorable external environment, 
economic failure, and insecurity. The Kim family has pursued nuclear proliferation as a 
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United States. While bilateral negotiations and agreements contributed to the freeze of 
North Korea’s nuclear programs in the first and second nuclear crisis, the nuclear 
material stockpile of North Korea is believed to have grown.162 
This author concludes that North Korean nuclear policy is to seek nuclear 
weapons as the best diplomatic option to solve threats from the United States and to 
extract concessions from Washington and its allies. No doubt, Kim Jong Il possesses 
some nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Even so, he continues to pursue negotiations 
with Washington, because the regime does not want greater isolation and a worsened 
relationship with the United States. 
1. Limitations of Brinkmanship and Crisis Escalation Diplomacy 
North Korea’s nuclear strategy and negotiating behavior toward the United States 
resulted in nuclear proliferation and enhancement of its economic interests. Since the Six-
Party Talks became the primary channel for resolving North Korean nuclear issues and 
North Korean negotiating patterns have been revealed internationally, Pyongyang can no 
longer use its trademark negotiation strategy of brinkmanship and crisis escalation. 
During the first and second nuclear crisis, North Korea dealt with U.S. brinkmanship by 
supporting its own economic interests instead of unilateralism and brinkmanship. This 
shows that North Korean strategy has changed from traditional brinkmanship, crisis 
diplomacy, ideology and guerilla tactics toward the United States to more pragmatic 
approaches. Examples include freezing the Yongbyon plutonium program after the 2007 
Six-Party Talks, providing nuclear activities information to Chinese officials in Beijing 
on June 26, 2008,163 and demolishing the Yongbyon cooling tower on June 27, 2008.164 
These events are evidence of limits on brinkmanship and crisis diplomacy and may 
represent a change to a more predictable nuclear strategy.        
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III. U.S. RESPONSES TO THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ policies toward the North Korean nuclear program have 
attracted increased attention in the series of North Korean nuclear crises since 1993. The 
Washington-Pyongyang nuclear negotiations that began in June 1993 resulted in the 
signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, even though the negotiations were 
held in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. But normalization of the diplomatic and 
economic relationship between the two countries did not emerge and, as the second 
nuclear crisis erupted, mutual distrust continued to grow on both sides. Indeed, the 
policies of the United States toward the North Korean nuclear program today are 
increasingly complicated regarding U.S. national interests versus North Korea’s national 
interests.165      
U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear agenda has been the focus of 
numerous articles and books.  During the post-Cold War era, the United States was 
attentive to what the DPRK wanted to have, but the foreign and defense policies of 
United States did not prioritize North Korea’s nuclear problem. As a result, U.S. North 
Korean policy was not deemed as very important and false hopes at the DPRK’s possible 
internal collapse caused a disinclination in Washington to deal directly with Kim Jong 
Il.166  
Growing tensions between both sides centered on the North Korean nuclear 
agenda that became more ominous to post-9/11 America because it was thought that Kim 
Jong Il might take advantage of the United States’ preoccupation with Islamic terrorists.   
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At the same time, U.S concerns became more ominous to North Koreans because it was 
thought that the United States might attempt to apply the preemptive paradigm of the 
Bush Doctrine to the North Korean nuclear crisis.167   
After North Korea’s explosive test on October 9, 2006, the Bush administration 
showed a new flexibility to resolving the North Korea nuclear problem. Bush’s decision 
to change his policy toward North Korea was significant to resolve this tension. 
Moreover, it was a turning point toward the agreement reached in February 2007. 
To examine the U.S. response to the North Korean nuclear program, this chapter 
begins by looking at U.S. goals toward the North Korean nuclear issue. It will then move 
on to U.S policy during the first and second North Korean nuclear crises. Finally, it will 
attempt to describe and explain overall U.S. negotiation strategies in nuclear talks with 
DPRK.  
In sum, the United States pursued denuclearization in North Korea as a U.S. 
strategic goal in order to maintain stability and peace in Northeast Asia and to enhance a 
U.S.-led global non-proliferation policy. During the first nuclear crisis, initially, a 
coercive and aggressive diplomatic pattern had been adopted by the Clinton 
administration. However, as tension grew and both sides recognized the others intentions, 
Washington used a give-and-take diplomatic policy to resolve the crisis so that the 
Agreed Framework in 1994 could be signed by the two hostile countries. However, after 
the breakout of the North Korean uranium program issue and 9/11, the Bush 
administration adopted hawkish approaches to deal with the North Korea nuclear 
program by breaking up the 1994 Agreed Framework. As tensions between the two 
countries increased, Bush’s hard-line approach failed to deter North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons and long-range missile development. After North Korea’s explosive test in 
October 2006, the United States engaged again in a cooperative negotiation with North 
Korea by signing the Six-Party Talks Agreement in February 2007.  
In terms of U.S. negotiation strategies with the DPRK, U.S. policy toward North 
Korea has been influenced by not only the American leader’s perception regarding the 
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North Korean regime, but also the internal and external context that the United States 
faced. Fundamentally, during the Clinton term, the United States attempted to modify 
North Korea’s bad behavior through deterrence and engagement responses. In contrast, 
the Bush administration tried to change the Pyongyang regime by labeling the North 
Korea regime as part of the “axis of evil,” and attempting to coerce it into favorable 
policies after the apparent failure of the Bush administration’s hard-line approach, the 
United States attempted to settle the North Korean nuclear crisis by adopting a new 
flexibility after North Korea’s explosive test in October 2006.     
B. U.S. GOALS TOWARD NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
DURING THE TWO NUCLEAR CRISES 
U.S. negotiations with North Korea in 1993 were closely related to its global non-
proliferation policy and goal of preserving the NPT system. Moreover, the North Korean 
nuclear and missile programs became directly linked to a U.S. security concern. A 
Pyongyang regime with nuclear weapons could threaten U.S. allies, escalate nuclear 
proliferation in Northeast Asia, and transfer such technology to other regions of the world. 
Given the U.S. troop presence in South Korea and Japan, there is no doubt that 
Northeast Asia is of strategic importance to the United States. Unavoidably, U.S. forces 
would be involved in any initial conflict such as war on the Korean Peninsula.  The 
primary goal toward North Korean nuclear weapons is the non-proliferation of WMD, 
which is in the interest of all countries in international community. But, American 
presidents have refrained from enunciating the specific consequences that would result 
from a North Korean nuclear weapon program. An attempt at regime change similar to 
the Iraqi Freedom model is improbable because of the prospect of high costs. 
The United States was concerned that North Korea might choose to sell nuclear 
material to possible states and terrorist groups after 9/11. The disturbing fact is that it 
would be impossible to know whether such a transfer ever took place because of the 
impossibility of  searching all ships departing port and catching smuggling across North 
Korea’s border in nearby China.168  
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In sum, U.S. goals toward North Korean nuclear weapons are to deter North 
Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and eliminate existing nuclear weapons in the 
DPRK in order to improve security in Northeast Asia and secure herself from potential 
nuclear terror and North Korea’s long-range missile threat.  U.S. goals regarding the non-
proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons are also significant for the international 
community.    
C. U.S. POLICY DURING THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
CRISIS 
1. Historical Background 
The first North Korean nuclear crisis emerged in the early 1990s. In the first few 
years after the Cold War’s end, new evidence of a North Korean nuclear program drove 
the United States to support a series of measures persuading North Korea to accept the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.  
North Korea took its time and moved slowly, not signing its safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA until April 10, 1992, seven years after it signed the NPT. When the 
safeguards had been agreed, the Pyongyang regime declared its nuclear facilities in early 
May. The IAEA immediately sent inspectors to each of the nuclear facilities to make sure 
the DPRK was complying with the agreements and its regulations. These IAEA 
inspections began in May 1992.169 The declaration included details of North Korean 
uranium mining sites, nuclear plants, two nuclear reactors under construction at 
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The North’s threat to withdraw from the NPT brought the South-North Joint 
Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992 to an abrupt halt. 
Tensions were high on the Korean Peninsula as the confrontation between Pyongyang 
and Washington deepened.171  
North Korea had already reprocessed more plutonium than it had declared, but the 
IAEA did not know this. The North Korean nuclear reactor had been shut down for about 
100 days in 1989. No countries, including the United States, took any action when North 
Korea did this. The policy adopted by the international community was to have the 
Pyongyang regime remain in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and then bring it into 
compliance.172 
In the midst of the dispute over demand for a special inspection by the IAEA on 
suspected sites in February 1993,173 North Korea provocatively announced that it would 
withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993. Under the treaty regulation, the withdrawal 
of a state does not take effect until after a three-month waiting period, which would mean 
a deadline of June 12 for negotiations to keep them in the treaty.174 
In this grave atmosphere, the United States responded by holding high-level 
meetings with the DPRK in New York in early June 1993. Initially, the talks produced a 
joint statement outlining the basic principles for continuing the U.S.-DPRK dialogue, 
North Korea’s “suspension” of its NPT withdrawal, and a symbolic promise of 
concessions from the United States. However, confrontation between the IAEA and 
DPRK continued for three months with regards to a full range of ad hoc and routine  
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inspections. On November 1, 1993, IAEA Director General Hans Blix submitted a report 
to the UN General Assembly that North Korea had not cooperated with the IAEA and 
had continually violated its safeguards agreement.175 
As the attempted diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear confrontation 
appeared to be falling, hard-liners who demanded a tougher approach gained strength in 
the United States.176 Also, most Clinton administration officials, except a few moderates 
including Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, viewed that a more hard-line 
approach toward the North Korean nuclear issue would be necessary.177 Amidst this 
continued stalemate, the United States provided a draft of UN sanctions and consulted 
with the members of the UN Security Council. The situation was moving forward in an 
increasingly conflictual direction.178   
A senior Defense Department official announced that the United States had 
intensified its intelligence operations on the Korean Peninsula in June 11, 1994, and set 
up a four-step military plan for the peninsula.179 President Clinton, Vice-President Al 
Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary William Perry, and 
Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea Gary Luck assembled a meeting at the White House 
where three military options were drawn up.180 From spring to summer of 1994, heavy 
tanks, Bradley armored vehicles, and brand new ammunition-loading equipments arrived 
and a total of six batteries with 48 launchers and over 300 Patriot missiles were 
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additionally deployed to South Korea.181 The Korean Peninsula had become the staging 
ground for the most serious preparation for war since 1953.182 
In the midst of the mounting crisis, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited 
Pyongyang to talk to Kim Il Sung not as an official envoy of the United States, but as a 
concerned citizen. Carter’s visit in June 1994 helped to defuse tensions and President 
Clinton embraced Carter’s proposal, which was that U.S. would likely accept a deal that 
committed North Korea to a verifiable nuclear freeze in exchange for U.S. economic 
assistance and talks on normalizing diplomatic relation. U.S-DPRK talks opened in 
Geneva July 8, 1994. However, the talks were recessed by news of Kim Il Sung’s death, 
then resumed again in August. Both sides signed with the Agreed Framework on 21 
October 1994.183 
2 The Agreed Framework of 1994 
The Agreed Framework in 1994 entailed a set of joint and national-level 
obligations. The details of the Agreed Framework are as follows:184 
• The United States would provide two LWRs of a thousand megawatts 
each to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities by the target date of 2003. The United States will organize an 
international consortium to finance and supply the LWR project and will 
serve as “the principal point of contact with the DPRK.”185 
• If the project would require U.S. equipment, as is likely, the United States 
and the DPRK would conclude a bilateral cooperation agreement, as 
required by U.S. law.  
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• The United States would arrange to supply the DPRK with 500,000 tons 
of oil annually “to offset the energy forgone” owing to the freeze of the 
DPRK’s nuclear program, pending completion of the first LWR unit.  
• The DPRK would freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and the related 
facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and the related 
facilities. The IAEA will be allowed to monitor the freeze. Dismantlement 
of the DPRK's reactors and reprocessing plant would be completed when 
the LWR project is completed.  
• The United States and the DPRK would cooperate in storing the spent fuel 
from the 5-MW (e) experimental reactor during construction of the LWR 
project and disposing of the fuel in a way that does not involve 
reprocessing in the DPRK.  
• The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and 
economic relations. Both sides would work together for peace and security 
on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.  
• The DPRK would remain a party to the NPT and would allow IAEA 
inspections under the treaty. On conclusion of the supply contract for the 
LWR project, IAEA inspections would resume at all declared sites.  
• When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before 
delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK would allow inspection of 
the disputed sites. More precisely, it would allow the IAEA to take all 
steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations 
with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness 
of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.  
• Terms of repayment: KEDO would be repaid by the DPRK interest-free 
over 20 years, inclusive of a three-year grace period, beginning with the 
completion of each LWR plant.186 
The primary U.S. concern was focused on the constraints imposed on North 
Korea’s nuclear weapon program, in return for U.S. leadership of the LWR project and 
the provision of heavy fuel oil. In other words, the Clinton administration attempted to 
change the North Korean nuclear policy by providing economic and political incentives 
that could meet the DPRK’s energy and security needs. 
In the initial phase of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States went 
to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, the Clinton 
administration dispatched substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared 
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for striking the North’s nuclear facilities. Grave tensions promoted a “crime-and-
punishment approach,” which portrayed North Korea as a threatening rogue state.187 
However, whenever the United States used an aggressive policy to coerce North Korea 
into giving up its nuclear weapons program, the North became more recalcitrant. 
After the turning point of Jimmy Carter’s extraordinary unofficial diplomatic 
initiative, Washington showed a more cooperative attitude toward nuclear talks with 
North Korea, and Pyongyang responded with concessions. The Clinton administration 
recognized that North Korea’s policy could be read as a bargaining chip to get economic 
and political concessions in return for an abandonment of the nuclear option. Then, the 
United States employed a “give-and-take” diplomatic policy to settle the nuclear crisis 
with the DPRK.188    
In sum, the U.S. response toward the North Korean nuclear issue during the first 
crisis shifted from a coercive and aggressive approach to reciprocity, along with 
recognition of the Pyongyang regime’s intention for its nuclear program and the 
uncertainty of military actions. In doing so, the United States attempted to ultimately 
achieve a modification of North Korea’s rogue behavior, particularly its development of 
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and threatening of the United States and its 
allies.      
D. DEBATE ON ENGAGEMENT STRATETIES TO SOLVE THE NORTH 
KOREA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ISSUE 
After the Agreed Framework, the tension seemed to be relieved and the 
implementing agreement was created to successfully freeze the North Korean nuclear 
program. However, there were still unsettled problems regarding funding of the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization, as well as provisions of heavy fuel oil until  
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the light water reactors were completed.189 The Pyongyang regime continued to stall on 
implementing IAEA inspection at the Yongbyon nuclear facility as well as additional 
suspected nuclear facilities.190 
A few weeks before, the Republicans had swept the congressional elections in 
1994, and this jeopardized the congressional funding of the Agreed Framework. Also, 
many of Clinton’s administration officials believed that North Korea’s political and 
economic collapse was imminent; this assumption created concern among U.S. officials 
about a backlash from Pyongyang.191   
North Korea’s severe famine became one of the most-debated foreign policy 
problems in Congress in 1996 and 1997, while its ballistic missiles program dominated 
the congressional debate on Northeast Asia in the final two and a half years of the Clinton 
administration. U.S. policy toward North Korea during the Clinton years pursued an 
inducement and engagement policy to achieve further U.S. objectives. But, the Congress, 
dominated by the Republicans, stated critically that the “U.S. assistance served only to 
prop up a dangerous and brutal regime and reward it for misbehavior.”192   
Debate on engagement strategies toward North Korea within the United States 
dramatically shifted on August 31, 1998, when the DPRK launched a three-stage 
Taepodong missile that flew over Japan. Despite the fact that the U.S. intelligence 
community eventually estimated that the test was unsuccessful, this clearly demonstrated 
a more advanced development in ballistic missile technology than U.S. and its allies 
intelligence agencies had previously assessed.193  In the U.S. response to the test of 
Taepodong missile, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
States had concluded that the Pyongyang regime “would be able to inflict major 
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destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a 
capability.”194  However, the CIA had assessed in 1995 that North Korea would not have 
long-range missile capability at least until 2010.195  
On the North Korea issues about missile and nuclear programs, U.S. intelligence 
agencies during the 1990s were split, the Department of Defense frequently raised more 
significant assessments than the State Department and CIA. For example, Thomas Ricks 
reported, in the Wall Street Journal of September 30, 1997, that the U.S. Department of 
Defense predicted that the Pyongyang regime was likely to try Korean reunification by 
military force because the DPRK’s failing economic condition was becoming worse; 
however, the State Department and CIA believed the regime’s primary goal was self-
preservation, and U.S action for war might push the DPRK into a confrontation which it 
sought to avoid. 196  Additionally, Anthony Lake, former Clinton National Security 
Advisor stated that the State Department and CIA had often reported diametrically 
opposed estimates on North Korea’s motivations during the first North Korean nuclear 
crisis.197  
The Clinton administration’s North Korea policy was poorly coordinated. 
Legislation that the U.S. Congress approved in October 1998 mandated the appointment 
of a senior administration official to coordinate with North Korea, and President Clinton 
appointed former Defense Secretary William Perry to that position on November 12 to 
review U.S. engagement strategies toward North Korea. After ten months of review, the 
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The first path envisioned a comprehensive set of negotiations that would 
lead to reciprocal actions by Washington and Pyongyang to eliminate the 
North Korean nuclear and long-range missile threats and would result in 
the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations. The second, less 
desirable path was a continued policy of containment, most likely leading 
to an increase in tensions on the Korean Peninsula.198   
Congressional opinions on the Perry report and a new agreement regarding 
suspension of North Korea missile tests until 2001 were mixed. Some Republicans 
sharply criticized the partial lifting of sanctions, complaining that U.S. policy would be 
uneasy until Pyongyang surely guaranteed it would freeze all its nuclear and missile 
programs.199  But most Democrats continued to support Clinton’s approach. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking Democrat Joseph Biden stated that “The question 
is not whether North Korea is a desirable partner for peace.  Kim Jong Il has all the 
appeal of Saddam Hussein. The question is how we manage the North Korean threat. I 
can’t imagine how the situation would be improved if we did not offer North Korea a 
chance to choose peace over truculence.”200 During Russian President Putin’s visit to 
Pyongyang In July 2000 and North Korean Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok’s visit to 
Washington in September 2000, Kim Jong Il proposed a comprehensive missile deal with 
the United States. When North Korean Vice-Marshal Jo Myong Rok visited Washington, 
President Clinton considered a path-breaking trip to Pyongyang. The issue of the North 
Korea engagement debate was placed on center stage. In reply to Jo Myong Rok’s Visit, 
President Clinton sent Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000 to 
negotiate the North Korean missile problem. In the end, the United States ran out of 
negotiating time. The tactical stand-off, combined with outcome of the 2000 U.S. 
presidential elections and the Clinton administration’s focus on the Middle East peace 
negotiations in late 2000, doomed the effort to reach a U.S.-North Korean missile 
agreement.201 
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Some Republicans asserted that Clinton was attempting to “beef up his resume 
before leaving office.”202 Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Chairman Craig Thomas argued, “I don’t think the president needs to go. 
He’s trying to get his last licks in, and I don’t think this is one he has to do.”203 On the 
other hand, Selig S. Harrison warned that a decision not to go would strengthen hard-
liners in Pyongyang to disagree with the abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
and commented to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that “they only want to talk 
about the U.S. end of it, but the real question for us is what the consequences will be in 
Pyongyang. I’m afraid we’ll pay dearly if he doesn’t go, whoever is president.”204 In the 
end, Clinton’s decision not to travel to Pyongyang came in a response to the Republican 
opposition that there would be insufficient time to specifically nail down a missile 
agreement and that he “should not tie hands of a possible Republican successor.”205  
E. U.S. POLICY DURING THE SECOND NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR 
CRISIS 
1. No Engagement Policy 
Many people argue that the fundamental difference between the Clinton and Bush 
administrations is their perceptions of the DPRK. President Bush considered North Korea 
to be a reckless and aggressive regime with which the United States could not engage and 
achieve its goals. As a result, the Bush administration concluded that U.S. foreign policy 
should be tougher and hawkish and should punish North Korea’s rogue behavior after 
September 11, 2001.206 
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After taking office in January 2001, President Bush distrusted North Korea’s self-
described peaceful intentions toward its nuclear program policy. He expressed this 
perception to Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung in March 2001. Bush stated, “I 
do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea….I am concerned about the 
fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world.”207 
Richard L. Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, in the Bush administration 
had previously drafted a Republican blueprint for North Korean policy titled “A 
Comprehensive Approach to North Korea.” 208  The report was delivered during the 
Clinton years and was not an official policy statement of President Bush. But, it described 
the Bush administration’s initial North Korea policy because Bush’s comprehensive 
approach to North Korea was based on the Armitage report and the advice of key Bush 
officials, such as head the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Carl W. Ford and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz. Even though the enhancement of 
deterrence was a main component of this comprehensive approach, the report mentioned 
that this approach meant that U.S. North Korean policy is “prepared to accept North 
Korea as a legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relations.”209      
As the Armitage report recommended, the Bush administration initially 
considered diplomacy to be a good approach to test Kim Jong Il’s intentions, whether or 
not diplomacy produced positive results.210 In fact, U.S. North Korean policy in the 
Armitage report was not very different from the Clinton administration’s approach, as 
reviewed by the Perry report. William Perry recommended diplomacy to seek complete 
and verifiable assurances that North Korea give up nuclear weapons ambitions and 
missile-related affairs. In cases engagement approaches produced unsuccessful results, as 
Armitage did, Perry concluded that the U.S. policy toward the DPRK should include 
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strong deterrence mechanisms─to contain and preempt North Korean nuclear and long-
range missiles facilities.211 Although the Armitage report described a more pessimistic 
prediction than the Perry report, in consideration of North Korea’s intentions, the 
perceptional gap regarding North Korea between the two administrations made a 
difference with regard to the recommended North Korean policies, and was shaped by 
internal and external context that the United States faced, such as the 9/11 attack and 
power transition in Congress and the administration.    
However, from January to June 2001, the Bush Administration reviewed U.S. 
policy toward North Korean with several motivated factors: a more skeptical perception 
of the Pyongyang regime by the administration, on-going difficulties of implementation 
of the Agreed Framework, and suspicion of covert nuclear weapons development and 
continued missile development and sales. This formal policy review did not reject 
engagement toward North Korea, but was based on a slowdown approach─emphasizing 
verification and reciprocity and broadening the agenda for negotiation.212  The Bush 
administration determined that the United States needed to change U.S. policy toward the 
North Korea nuclear issue.  
The Bush administration appeared to have a tougher and more realist approach to 
dealing with the Pyongyang regime, suspecting the regime’s intentions and commitment 
to real peace on the Korean Peninsula.213 The Bush national security team reassessed the 
true goals of the Kim Jong Il regime and concluded that a hard-line realist approach was 
the best option to deal with North Korea’s negotiating tactics of brinkmanship and crisis 
diplomacy.214 
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The Bush administration officials also viewed the 1994 Agreed Framework 
differently. For example, as foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential candidate 
George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice, argued, “The Agreed Framework attempted to bribe 
North Korea into forsaking nuclear weapons, but there is a trap inherent in this approach 
because the possibility for miscalculation is very high.”215 Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz noted that it “does not solve the North Korean nuclear problem but 
simply postpones that problem and may, in the process, make its solution ultimately more 
difficult.” 216  As a result, the Bush administration adopted a limited Clinton-level 
engagement that treated the Agreed Framework as the initial phase of a policy toward the 
North Korea nuclear crisis, and not as the end of the crisis. It also quietly shelved talks on 
a missile deal, believing North Korea could not be trusted. Former Secretary Defense 
Perry strongly criticized the Bush administration for abandoning the missile talks.217 
After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration’s foreign policy appeared to  
toughen by identifying North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil”218 and introducing 
preemptive action as an option in the war on terrorism in 2002. The following lists the 
events of the Bush administration policy. 
• January 29, 2002: Identification of North Korea as part of an “Axis of 
Evil”219  
• March 2002: Public release of the Nuclear Posture Review 2002, which 
included the prospective use of nuclear weapons in a major Korean 
contingency220  
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• June 1, 2002: Announcement of the “Bush Doctrine,” which included 
preemptive strikes on North Korea221 
• September 2002: Announcement of the National Security Strategy 2002, 
which described North Korea one of the United States’ national security 
threats222  
The terrorist attacks of September 11 reaffirmed the shrinking of Bush’s policy 
for engaging the DPRK and strengthened the Bush administration’s view of the 
Pyongyang regime as a “rogue state,” not a negotiating partner.223  After the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the Bush administration had neither initiated its recommended 
“comprehensive approach,” nor begun a “serious discussion” linking the Pyongyang 
regime to the U.S. global war on terrorism.224  
2. Breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework 
From October to December 2002, with the growing possibilities of an Iraq War, a 
more immediate and unpredicted second North Korean nuclear crisis loomed again. 
During U.S. special envoy James Kelly’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2002 the United 
States accused North Korea of cheating on the 1994 deal by possessing a covert highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) program. By the end of 2002, Washington and Pyongyang had 
discarded their respective commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. By ending 
the Agreed Framework, the Bush administration decided that the United States was 
willing to live with future uncertainties and dangers and regard North Korea as an 
illegitimate regime and a direct threat to vital U.S. security goals. It also seemed to 
believe that the DPRK would back down. But it did not. 
The Agreed Framework in 1994 had successfully frozen the Kim regime’s nuclear 
activities at Yongbyon, including the work of a plutonium reprocessing facility. Had 
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North Korea’s reprocessing activities not been frozen, the North could have developed a 
significant numbers of nuclear weapons, as well as sold weapons-grade plutonium to 
other countries or groups.225     
In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence revealed that North Korea had a covert 
HEU program, which triggered successive events that reasserted Bush’s no engagement 
approach toward the Kim Jong Il regime. U.S. official intelligence assessed that North 
Korea had secretly proceeded with on an alternative nuclear weapons program since the 
late 1990s. According to the CIA’s assessment, North Korea’s uranium activities 
appeared during 2001, including imports of materials for the building of a gas-centrifuge 
enrichment facility from Pakistan. This deal could have provided North Korea with an 
alternative fissile material to substitute for the frozen plutonium reprocessing activities 
under the Agreed Framework.226    
Although the United States was initially unlikely to highlight the findings of the 
HEU program, this avoidance had ended by the early fall of 2002. Indeed, the Bush 
administration exploited the intelligence for political purposes. The evidence of North 
Korea’s malfeasant behavior provided powerful driving forces to scuttle the Agreed 
Framework. U.S. officials may have anticipated that a revived nuclear crisis could result 
in a more satisfactory and durable settlement than the earlier Agreed Framework.227  
When it comes to two types of fissile material used for nuclear weapons, they are 
categorized as weapons-grade plutonium, which is a by-product of nuclear fission 
containing sufficient proportions of the plutonium-239 isotope, and uranium, enriched to 
93 percent with the uranium-235 isotope.228  The gas-centrifuge method is believed to be 
the most practicable and effective way for states that are planning to pursue a covert 
enrichment capability. The question of whether plutonium or enriched uranium is the 
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preferred technology to produce nuclear weapons remains debatable. There are merits 
and liabilities to both paths, including such issues of “reliability and efficiency of design; 
volatility and availability of materials; complexity, cost, and ability to avoid detection; 
and the fissile material requirements for different types of nuclear weapon designs.”229  
The history of nuclear proliferation in the world reveals that there is no best path and 
each country’s nuclear history has been different, relying on the level of its nuclear 
projects and the specific technologies to which they could access.230  Amid debate on 
North Korea’ HEU activities in the United States, despite the constraints and the absence 
of a detected enrichment facility, the Bush administration asserted that Pyongyang was 
secretly developing an HEU program designed for military goals in violation of the 
Agreed Framework.231 
After two years of no bilateral negotiations between the two countries, the Bush 
officials’ accusation of Kim Jong Il’s HEU program was ignited by Assistant Secretary of 
State Kelly’s Pyongyang visit in October 2002.  Kelly’s presentation during the meetings 
with his North Korea counterparts in Pyongyang depicted U.S. responses to North 
Korean nuclear strategy well.  U.S. envoy James Kelly had no “room for maneuver, given 
the instructions of his superiors.”232  As Kelly recounted:  
I stated that the United States now had a pre-condition to further 
engagement─that the DPRK's uranium enrichment program should be 
dismantled immediately. I told the North Koreans that we had been 
prepared to present a “bold approach” to improve bilateral relations.… But 
given the fresh information of nuclear weapons development efforts, I told 
my North Korean interlocutors that this approach was no longer possible 
without action on their part. I did not confront the Vice Foreign Minister 
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emphatic that the U.S. knew the program was being aggressively 
implemented and it was a serious violation of international agreements. I 
asked the North Korean government to weigh its response carefully.233  
Kelly further stated that Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Kwan “angrily denied 
that the DPRK had an HEU program. He dismissed my statement, claiming it was a 
fabrication.”234 And then, in the last meeting in Pyongyang, First Vice Foreign Minister 
Kang Sok Ju admitted the existence of an HEU program:  
Kang Sok Ju, who surprised me by making it quite clear, even before I 
was able to make my presentation, that North Korea was proceeding with 
an HEU program and that it considered the Agreed Framework to be 
“nullified.” … he tried to blame this situation on U.S. policy under the 
current Administration, but made no response when I pointed out that the 
HEU program began well before the current Administration.235 
After Assistant Secretary Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, the State Department 
announced that the North had admitted to the existence of a covert HEU program, as well 
as contending that Pyongyang had declared its intention to end the Agreed Framework.236  
Even though North Korea labeled Bush’s approach to her as hostile, President 
Bush and his officials repeatedly asserted that the administration had “no hostile 
intent”237 and the reemerged tension did not constitute a crisis but a “serious situation,” 
on which they focused on a “peaceful resolution through diplomatic channels.”238 The 
Bush administration seemed determined to deny Pyongyang’s satisfaction of a direct  
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response to North Korea’s violations of the Agreed Framework and remained unchanged 
by the calls of North Korea’s neighbors (South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China) for the 
United States to pursue a bilateral engagement with North Korea. 
In October 2002, the fate of the Agreed Framework quickly became jeopardized, 
as both sides moved toward a breakdown of the Agreed Framework. Senior officials 
acknowledged that “as we know it is dead.”239 Furthermore, with the concurrence of 
South Korea and Japan, the United States made a decision to cut off shipments of heavy 
fuel oil to the DPRK.240 In response to this approach, a week later, North Korea declared 
that the Agreed Framework was dead, asserting that the oil supplies were the part of the 
framework that the United States had  violated as obligations.241   
Despite the fact that Pyongyang abruptly reactivated its plutonium program and 
declared its withdrawal from the NPT, the Bush administration did not change its 
approach to the Pyongyang regime there would be no bilateral negotiations with North 
Korea. Breakdown of the Agreed Framework meant that the Bush administration decided 
to live with future uncertainties and dangers and to readdress the imperfect 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program under the Agreed Framework.   
3. Hawk Engagement Policy 
From October 2002 to January 2003, successive U.S. foreign policy had brought 
the world to a most dangerous moment, with an increasing possibility of war not only in 
the Mideast, but also on the Korean Peninsula. Both confrontations are the consequence 
of the Bush administration’s proactive goal of regime change to overcome perceived 
threat to the United States and its allies’ interests.    
The Bush administration had three motives in its response to North Korean 
nuclear issue. First, by identifying North Korea as an “Axis of Evil,” it could counter 
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claims that the United States was focusing its “war on terrorism” against Islamic states 
alone. Second, the United States could compel Congress to approve funding for its 
missile defense system by emphasizing on North Korea’s nuclear threat. Third, Bush 
officials were relying on more hawkish advice, which asserted that a policy of isolating 
and pushing North Korea would encourage the collapse of its dangerous and 
undemocratic regime.242  
With these motives, the Bush administration implemented a “hawk engagement” 
policy to justify its hard-line strategy aimed at accelerating the collapse of North Korea. 
Soon-to-be National Security Council aide Victor Cha argued that “engagement is the 
best way to build a coalition for punishment tomorrow.”243 A necessary condition for 
coercing North Korea is the formation of a regional consensus that every opportunity to 
resolve the problem in a non-confrontational manner has been exhausted. Without this 
consensus, implementing any form of coercion that actually puts pressure on the regime 
will not work.244 Cha also said that “engagement does not operate without a net, it is the 
exit strategy.”245  
In terms of the type of “engagement” foreseen by the Bush administration, the 
U.S. response would be to bring pressure on Pyongyang through military approaches, 
while the administration would deny any crisis. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, commander 
of U.S. forces in the Pacific, requested the dispatch of a few more squadrons of warplanes 
to the region in January 2003. U.S. officials confirmed that the aircraft carrier Carl 
Vinson with its 75 aircraft had been sent to the region and that 24 B-52 and B-1 bombers 
had been deployed on alert to Guam in February 2003.246 By conjuring up threats of the 
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United States as a prelude to talks, the first one was to disclose the existence of updated 
U.S. military plans described as “so aggressive that they could provoke a war.”247 The 
second one was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to intercept delivery of “WMD 
or missiles and related items at sea, in the air, or on land.”248 Hard-liners in the Bush 
administration pushed for more military pressure, economic sanctions, and naval 
blockades to end the stalemate. The Bush administration demanded “complete, verifiable 
and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)”249 and required North Korea to dismantle its 
nuclear programs in advance of U.S. reciprocity and the construction of the two nuclear 
plants promised in the Agreed Framework in 1994. Secretary of State Powell asserted 
that “They will hear what we think about the situation. They will hear our strong 
views.”250   
While Pyongyang demanded bilateral negotiations with Washington to address 
the nuclear issue, the Bush administration was trying to build a united approach with 
regional partners, those countries significantly affected by North Korea’s development of 
nuclear weapons. When North Korea demanded bilateral talks with the United States, 
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage testified that “of course we’re going to have direct 
talks with the North Koreans….Before we do that, we want to have a strong international 
platform.”251  Thus, Bush’s hawk engagement policy produced strict instructions against 
negotiation or even to one-on-one talks with North Korea.252  
While the Bush administration maintained a pretended commitment to a 
diplomatic settlement of the North Korean nuclear stalemate, the Six-Party Talks had 
very few productive results due to divisions within the administration over implementing 
its North Korean policy such as the BDA issue and bank sanctions. Outside expert Peter 
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Beck explained that “the neo-cons refuse to allow the State Department to engage in 
meaningful negotiations…and until this happens, the Six-Party Talks will be virtually 
meaningless.”253 As Beck explained, “Kelly was reduced to reading statements prepared 
by the most hawkish elements of the administration….When the North Koreans asked 
what they would receive if they gave up their nuclear programs, they did not receive an 
answer.”254 The Bush’s hard-liners were continually pursing “hawk engagement” as “an 
instrument for revealing Pyongyang’s unreconstructed intentions” and establishing a 
multilateral framework for “punitive actions.”255 Furthermore, U.S. delegates were acting 
as if there was nothing inappropriate in their pressure for Pyongyang to completely 
dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks 
Beijing produced a joint statement in September 2005 to apparently settle North Korea 
nuclear problem. But in the face of the apparent success of the State Department, the U.S. 
Treasury Department had stepped up economic pressure on Pyongyang and underlined 
vigilance in the international banking sector regarding North Korea’s alleged money 
laundering and counterfeiting of U.S. currency. As a result, North Korea rejected the 
recently signed deal, the Pyongyang regime continued to produce plutonium at its 
Yongbyon nuclear facility.256 
4. North Korea’s Nuclear Explosive Test in 2006 and Resumption of the 
Six-Party Talks  
In the second term of the Bush administration, the United States approach to the 
North Korean nuclear issue began to change even before the North Korea’s nuclear test in 
2006. This was caused by changes in the political context, personnel, and an 
identification of its unproductive policy.257 Bush’s officials realized that their hard-line 
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policy toward North Korea had been ineffective. Thus, a change in U.S. policy toward 
North Korea appeared at the meeting in New York on 7 March 2006. The United States 
proposed bilateral talks with the DPRK in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. 
Additionally, leaders of the U.S. Congress argued that President Bush should offer 
bilateral talks and diplomatic normalization relations with Pyongyang.258  During the 
long-stalled talks with North Korea, the Bush administration had previously held to a 
policy that it would not offer any progress in terms of improvement of its relations with 
North Korea before the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs.  
While the new U.S. approach to North Korea was considered, the DPRK tested 
missiles, including a long-range Taepodong-II missile on 5 July 2006. It was assessed to 
be unsuccessful. But after its nuclear explosive test in October 2006, the North Korea 
announced that it “successfully conducted a nuclear test at a stirring time when all people 
of the country are making a great leap forward in the building of a great prosperous 
powerful socialist nation.” 259  After several days of assessment, U.S. authorities 
confirmed that the underground explosive test was nuclear, but had yielded less than one 
kiloton.260  
The U.S. government immediately condemned the nuclear test and called for a 
swift international response. President Bush told reporters that Pyongyang “constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security” and stated that the “transfer of nuclear weapons 
or materials by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave 
threat to the United States.”261 But Bush reaffirmed his commitment to diplomacy.262   
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The UN Security Council passed resolution 1718, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. 
Charter, which aimed at punishing North Korea for its nuclear explosive test by imposing 
economic sanctions on the Pyongyang regime on October 14, 2006.263   
North Korea wanted direct bilateral talks with the United States, but Bush’s hard-
liners had only agreed to bilateral talks within the frame of the Six-Party process. The 
United States urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without preconditions, 
but Pyongyang wanted Washington to unfreeze $24 million in its account at the Chinese 
Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in return for its participation in the Six-Party Talks. U.S. 
Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow hinted at a slight shift in the U.S. 
stance on bilateral talks with North Korea, saying that there was a possibility of a face-to-
face meeting between the U.S. and DPRK negotiations, if the North would also agreed to 
return to the Six-Party Talks.264   
The 13-month-boycotted Six-Party Talks resumed in Beijing on 18-22 December 
2006, but it ended without any breakthrough due to the U.S. and DPRK’s conflicting 
approach to the BDA issue.  U.S envoy Christopher Hill insisted that the Six-Party Talks 
should only focus on resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue, emphasizing that “It’s very 
important that we not focus on those financial issues but rather on the central matter of 
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.”265           
Even though questions about the usefulness of continuing the Six-Party Talks 
were raised among some U.S. officials, most concluded that the slow progress at the Six-
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Hill noted that “We are disappointed that we were unable to reach any agreement, and 
diplomacy is not an easy task, but like many things in life, you have to look at the 
alternatives.”266               
However, after North Korea’s explosive test, this round of the Six-Party Talks had 
two significant characteristics to point out. First, the Bush administration changed its 
hard-line policy toward the North Korea nuclear issue after the November 2006 mid-term 
elections, which returned both houses of Congress to Democratic control. President Bush 
also dismissed his hard-line Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. Likely under the influence of 
Secretary of State Rice, President Bush approved bilateral talks with North Korea in 
Berlin, although he had insisted for four years that he would not allow direct bilateral 
talks. By showing a new flexibility in dealing with North Korea nuclear issues, the Bush 
administration wanted to settle the second nuclear crisis in a diplomatic manner. Second, 
North Korea’s explosive test had contributed to a shift in relation between the U.S. and 
PRC. Both countries’ strategic cooperation toward North Korea nuclear problem was 
now essential.267    
Christopher Hill met his counterpart Kim Kye Gwan in Berlin on January 16-18, 
2007 to discuss the nuclear and the BDA issues. The U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks in Berlin 
were significant in that they were the first negotiation outside of the Six-Party Talks in 
Beijing. The talks produced mutually satisfying progress for the next round of the Six-
Party Talks─the outlines of a possible deal. Hill commented, in the midst of his talks in 
Berlin, that if North Korea were willing to give up its nuclear weapons programs, the 
United States would be willing to engage in “a bilateral process” to establish “a normal 
relationship.” 268  His comment clearly signaled that the Bush administration would 
engage in direct bilateral talks with Pyongyang, as the Pyongyang regime had long 
demanded.  
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5.  Six-Party Talks Agreement on February 13, 2007 
The third session of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing on 
February 8-13, 2007, among the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, 
and Russia. They reached a landmark agreement titled “Initial Actions for the 
Implementation for the Joint Statement.”269 Whose contents were as follows:270  
I.   The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial 
phase: 
• The DPRK would shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual 
abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the 
reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all 
necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA 
and the DPRK.  
• The DPRK would discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear 
programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium 
extracted from used fuel rods that would be abandoned pursuant to 
the Joint Statement.  
• The DPRK and the US would start bilateral talks aimed at 
resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full 
diplomatic relations. The US would begin the process of removing 
the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and 
advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.  
• The DPRK and Japan would start bilateral talks aimed at taking 
steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the 
Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of 
unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.  
• Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 
2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and 
humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties 
agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the 
DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency 
energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil 
(HFO) would commence within next 60 days.  
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II. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working 
Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of 
full implementation of the Joint Statement: 
• Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula  
• Normalization of DPRK-US relations  
• Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations  
• Economy and Energy Cooperation  
• Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism  
By signing the nuclear agreement on February 13, 2007, the Bush administration 
was willing to embark with a new flexibility to reach an agreement.271  Since the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 due to mainly the discovery of Pyongyang’s 
HEU program, the United States had insisted that the Pyongyang regime should not be 
rewarded for violating its non-proliferation obligations and it should abandon its nuclear 
weapon programs before it could receive anything in return.  This new stance emerged 
only after hard-liners in the Bush administration who had opposed engagement with 
North Korea, such as former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Ambassador 
to the United Nations John R. Bolton, and former Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz, had left the administration. As a result, the hard-liners’ stature was relatively 
weakened and the pragmatists’ position represented by Condoleezza Rice was enhanced 
in the Bush administration. 
With regard to the new U.S. flexibility, separately, the chief U.S. negotiator Hill 
said that the United Sates “will resolve within 30 days a dispute over U.S. charges that 
Banco Delta Asia in Macau has been laundering illicit money from North Korea.”272  
This represented a change in the U.S. approach to North Korea, which had previously 
asserted that the BDA dispute should be considered separately from the North Korean 
nuclear issue. The Bush administration was expected to unfreeze some of North Korea’s 
accounts at the Banco Delta Asia in Macao. Administration officials insisted that the 
                                                 
271 Glenn Kessler and Edward Cody, “U.S. Flexibility Credited in Nuclear Deal with N. Korea,” 
Washington Post, February 14, 2007.  
272 Ibid. 
 74
agreement was an improvement over the Agreed Framework in 1994. Under the new 
agreement, Pyongyang would disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility and eventually 
dismantle it in return for energy assistance. However, former U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations John Bolton slammed the new agreement on February 2007 saying it 
offered too many compromises and sent a “bad signal” to Iran.273 
In line with the February agreement, why did the Bush administration change its 
hard-line approach to the Pyongyang regime? After North Korea’s explosive test in 
October 2006, initially, President Bush continued to oppose international pressure on 
North Korea’s “bad behavior.”274   As Joseph Cirincione argued, “there is no other 
foreign policy victory that the president can likely achieve in 2007.  North Korea is one 
of the few (perhaps one of the only) possibilities.”275  President Bush may have “bowed 
to reality” in order to demonstrate a belief that could still garner diplomatic achievements 
and leave office with a successful presidential legacy.276      
After the mid-term elections of 2006, the Democratic-controlled Congress had 
been seen by many as giving public criticism to Bush’s foreign policy on the Iraq war. As 
a result, the president may have changed his approach to North Korea in order to achieve 
diplomatic progress with North Korea and to enable his administration to remain firm on 
his stance in Iraq. Furthermore, Congress began to favor direct bilateral talks with North 
Korea.277 
Lastly, by allowing Christopher Hill more diplomatic leeway than any of his 
predecessors, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was able to bypass the usual 
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government policy review procedures to take the accord directly to President Bush.278 He 
alone made the “deal or no deal” call. But the question remains:  why did he decide not to 
listen to advice from some of the remaining neo-cons in the administration? Possibly 
because of the departure of Rice’s rivals and President Bush’s intent to have a settlement 
of the North Korean nuclear impasse before the end of his term. In the end, after top 
hawks left Bush’s team, Rice and her aides, those who believed that the neo-cons blocked 
opportunities for a diplomatic settlement, grabbed leverage to deal with North Korea.    
F. NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES IN NUCLEAR TALKS WITH DPRK 
The United States has confronted a series of crises over North Korea’s attempts to 
develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles during the Clinton and Bush 
administrations. Both administrations initially pursued a hard-line policy that brought the 
two countries to the brink of war, both in 1994 and 2002. The policy’s failure led both 
administrations to adopt an engagement policy that helped forge diplomatic agreements 
between the two countries. This author argues that U.S. negotiation strategies have 
fluctuated by not only the perceptional differences regarding North Korea, by but also the 
specific situation that the United States faced and the flexibility that it gradually adopted.   
1. The Clinton Administration’s Strategies: Modification of North 
Korea’s Bad Behavior and Engagement  
The Clinton administration had responded to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions 
through a series of threats and incentives in an effort to modify North Korea’s bad 
behavior. Specifically, the administration had attempted to induce the Pyongyang regime 
leaders to give up any nuclear weapons program. Many people believe that the Clinton 
administration adopted a more soft-line approach than his predecessor. But, the Clinton 
administration approach was not initially conciliatory. Even though the United States 
wanted to talk with North Korea, it was simultaneously ready to employ coercive 
approaches, including military attacks and economic sanctions.  
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After Clinton took office, relations between the IAEA and the DPRK continued to 
deteriorate, and there was no progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. Although North 
Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT, the Korean Peninsula was soon 
plunged into an intense crisis. President Clinton considered the subsequent escalation the 
only time during his tenure when William Perry, Secretary of Defense “believed that the 
US was in serious danger of a major war.”279 The turning point of this impasse came with 
Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in June 1994 that led to the Agreed Framework in 
1994.  Clinton administration officials asserted that North Korea with nuclear weapons 
was so dangerous that the United States must carefully engage the DPRK to induce it to 
abandon its nuclear weapons program.280 Thus, the Clinton administration perceived the 
engagement policy as a good approach to build trust with North Korea, reduce its 
insecurity, and end its nuclear threat.281 They used various carrots, such as economic aid, 
diplomatic normalization, and regime assurance in return for Kim Jung Il’s abandonment 
of his nuclear weapons program. In this perspective, after the Agreed Framework was 
reached in 1994, President Clinton sent Kim Jong Il a letter of assurance and pledged to 
“use the full powers of his office” to adhere to the Agreed Framework and complete the 
light-water reactor project.282 
2. The Bush Administration’s Strategies: Regime Change Replaces 
Engagement, Followed by a Return to Engagement 
Bush’s strategy toward North Korea was not always hawkish; after the policy 
review delivered in June 2001, President Bush announced that the United States would 
pursue a “comprehensive approach” toward North Korea, which would encourage 
progress toward the two Koreas’ reconciliation and constructive relationship between the 
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United States and North Korea.283  But, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Bush 
administration’s strategies rapidly shifted to a hard-line approach, such as regime change 
and hawk engagement.  
The Bush administration also had a skeptical view about whether the Pyongyang 
regime could modify its behavior. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insisted that 
North Korea leaders are “idiotic” and warned North Korea with possibility of war and 
regime change. 284 Senior Bush administration officials believed that a diplomatic 
approach would not work, and the real objective of the engagement with North Korea 
was to test its true intentions, which included not only the desire to develop nuclear 
weapons, but also the ultimate intention to overthrow South Korea and reunify the 
Korean Peninsula under communist rule.285 Therefore, the engagement policy would 
only disclose North Korea’s true nature and provide legitimacy for a punitive option. 
Because the Pyongyang regime was seen as part of the “axis of evil,” the United States 
should offer a consistent, long-term strategy that would not only deter North Korea but 
also will replace its brutal regime.286 
In Bush’s second term, the U.S. strategy toward the North Korea nuclear issue 
turned to engagement as markedly as had the Clinton administration. This was caused by 
“changes in the political context, changes in personnel, and an acceptance of the reality 
on the ground” and the failure of their hawkish policy.287  Washington was ready for 
bilateral talks with North Korea outside the Six-Party Talks and dramatically departed 
from past policy.  
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G. CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE, ENGAGEMENT, AND ENDURING 
DILEMMA 
U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions were mixed with deterrence 
and engagement to achieve its goal of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.  During the first 
nuclear crisis, initially, the Clinton administration used coercive and aggressive 
approaches.  However, as the situation escalated, Washington decided to reciprocally 
engage with Pyongyang to resolve the crisis and modify North Korea’s bad behavior.  
After President Bush took office, the United States attempted to deter North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program and change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-
line approach. But, the long standoff between the two countries resulted in a gloomier 
situation toward non-proliferation in North Korea. After North Korea’s explosive test in 
October 2006, the United States engaged again with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks 
framework in 2007.  
U.S. strategies in nuclear talks with the DPRK have been shaped by the internal 
and external contexts that have been faced, such as changes in politics and personnel, and 
perceptions of the effectiveness of U.S. policy. The Bush administration approached the 
nuclear dilemma over North Korea’s nuclear programs initially with an aggressive 
attitude, but eventually recognized the enduring policy difficulties of dealing with the 
DPRK by showing a new flexibility.288 
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IV.  OPTIONS AFTER THE SIX-PARTY TALKS AGREEMENT OF 
FEBRUARY 13, 2007  
A. PYONGYANG’S RECENT NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY 
The Bush administration and North Korea are now negotiating to implement the 
February 2007 Six-Party Talks agreement. According to the CRS Report for Congress of 
January 21, 2008, the main features of the agreement some of which have already 
occurred as of this writing include the following: 289  
1. Phase One 
• North Korea is to freeze (“shut down and seal”) its nuclear installations at 
Yongbyon, including the operational five megawatt nuclear reactor and 
plutonium reprocessing plant. 
• North Korea would “invite back” the IAEA to monitor the freeze at 
Yongbyon.  
• As these arrangements are made, North Korea is to receive 50,000 tons of 
heavy oil. South Korea reportedly would finance this shipment. 
• North Korea “will discuss” with the other six parties “a list of all its 
nuclear programs, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods” 
from the five megawatt reactor (which North Korea claims to have 
reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium). 
• North Korea and the United States would “start bilateral talks aimed at 
resolving bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations.” 
The United States “will begin the process of removing” North Korea from 
the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and “advance the process of 
terminating” economic sanctions against North Korea under the U.S. 
Trading with the Enemy Act. 
Although unstated in the agreement, a de facto component of Phase One was 
Christopher Hill’s pledge to resolve the issue of U.S. sanctions against Banco Delta and 
the freezing of North Korean accounts within 30 days of February 13, 2007.  
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2. Phase Two 
• North Korea is to make “a complete declaration of all nuclear programs” 
• The IAEA will supervise the disablement of all existing nuclear facilities 
• North Korea is to receive “economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance 
up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil, including the initial 
shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy oil”290 
Pyongyang’s recent nuclear policy can be described with the terms “buying time” 
and “give-and-take” in the implementation of Phases One and Two. The Pyongyang 
regime has frequently attempted to slow the deal’s progress, possibly because there are 
internal conflicts. But this could also seen as bargaining strategy. There was initially little 
implementation of Phase One due to North Korea’s demand regarding the Banco Delta 
Asia affair. North Korea refused to implement its obligations in Phase One as long as this 
relatively small issue remained unresolved.291 The United States finally decided to allow 
North Korea to withdraw the $25 million.292 However, instead of withdrawing the money 
in cash, North Korea stalled by demanding assurances from the United States that the U.S. 
Treasury Department would not penalize any foreign banks that received transferred 
money from North Korea’s Banco Delta accounts; therefore, implementation of Phase 
One was delayed beyond the 60 days originally required under the February agreement. 
In June 2007, the United States and Russia handled the transfer through the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank to Russia’s central bank, which forwarded the money to a North 
Korea account in a private Russian bank.293    
Along with the missed 60-day deadline of Phase One, the December 31, 2007 
deadline for the reactor’s disablement was not met. The second session of the Sixth 
Round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007 produced a statement of the six parties 
on October 3, 2007. North Korea was “to provide a complete and correct declaration of 
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all its nuclear programs.”294  North Korea asserted that it had disclosed all of its nuclear 
programs on January 4, 2008, but the Bush administration insisted that it had not. The 
North Korean Foreign Ministry stated that North Korea had “done what it should do.”295 
U.S. officials responded that North Korea’s declaration of November 2007 was 
incomplete and thus inadequate.296 After slowing down progress for implementation of 
the February agreement, creating a lag of six months on the schedule, the North Korean 
government finally handed over its long-awaited declaration and the side documents 
regarding its plutonium-based nuclear program in June 2008.  
Pyongyang had nothing to gain by showing blatantly non-cooperative behavior. 
Therefore, it has used the so-called “buying time” strategy, which is to keep negotiations 
from completely failing, thereby arresting any threat of military action against North 
Korea and ensuring the flow of economic aid while negotiations are ongoing.297 
The other nuclear policy North Korea has used to its advantage is the give-and-
take approach. North Korea apparently required concessions first, then let the 
international community dismantle its nuclear installation at Yongbyon and then released 
information regarding its nuclear program. Similarly, after the money in the BDA 
account was transferred to North Korea, North Korea invited a team from the IAEA to 
negotiate the return of IAEA monitors to Yongbyon in July 2007, and international 
inspectors verified that the Yongbyon nuclear facilities were shut down.298   
The United States indicated its intent to remove North Korea from the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism.299 In turn, North Korea made its nuclear declaration including 
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important details about its plutonium-based nuclear program and demonstrated its 
commitment to halt its nuclear weapons program on June 26, 2008. After just a day, 
North Korea destroyed the most prominent symbol of its plutonium production, a cooling 
tower at North Korea’s main nuclear power plant, in the presence of U.S. State 
Department and Energy officials, observers from the IAEA, and the U.S. media on June 
27, 2008.300  In response, the United States restated that it would remove the country 
from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and lift some U.S. 
sanctions against North Korea.301 In its first reaction to the U.S. response, however, 
North Korea stated that “The U.S. measure should lead to a complete and all-out 
withdrawal of its hostile policy” toward North Korea “so that the denuclearization 
process can make smooth progress along its orbit.”302  
As a result of the disagreement between the two countries regarding a stringent 
verification protocol proposed by the United States,303 North Korea accused the United 
States of not fulfilling its promise to remove North Korea from the terrorism list after the 
end of a 45-day notification period that had begun with Bush’s announcement in June.304 
From North Korea’s perspective, pressing ahead with the strict verification plan was a 
betrayal of the deal that had resulted in submitting a declaration of its nuclear programs 
and blowing up the cooling tower.305 Therefore, when the Bush administration passed the 
45-day mark without any action, North Korea denounced it as “obviously a violation of  
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the principle of ‘action for action’ essential for realizing denuclearization.”306 Pyongyang 
then barred inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and began to reverse the work 
done to disable its key nuclear installations.  
North Korea was eventually removed from the U.S. list of terror-sponsoring states 
by the Bush administration on October 11, 2008. In return for being taken off the 
blacklist, North Korea used its give-and-take nuclear policy by immediately resuming 
disablement of its nuclear facilities.307 North Korea eventually gained its along-awaited 
demand. However, the credibility of North Korea really hinges on whether the 
Pyongyang regime complies with the nuclear agreement with the United States and other 
Six-Party Talks partners in a reliable manner or not.  
B. WASHINGTON’S RECENT POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREAN 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES 
Because of North Korea’s refusal to acknowledge an HEU program and its 
nuclear assistance to Syria,308 the North Korean nuclear talks had not yielded fruit for 
over a year. So the Bush administration compromised with North Korea─Pyongyang 
would declare how much plutonium it possessed over the years, instead of North Korea’s 
direct declaration of the HEU program and its assistance to Syria.309 
Since the Six-Party Talks agreement on February 13, 2007, the most significant 
move was to delist North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list on October 11, 2008. This 
move apparently shows the Bush administration’s policy toward the North Korean 
nuclear program: to act only after North Korea has shown good faith by offering enough 
cooperation on the broad principles for verifying its nuclear activities. This policy was 
undertaken, however, over the views of internal skeptics and the objections by a key U.S. 
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ally, Japan.310  The administration made a concession, again, on the North Korean nuclear 
declaration in order to achieve the most important goals of the actual freezing of North 
Korea’s nuclear program.  
This decision reflects an evolution in the Bush administration’s nuclear policy, 
leaning toward a more pragmatic and engagement-oriented approach to North Korea, and 
possibly further, to Iran and Syria. Since the North Korean nuclear explosive test in 
October 2006, the United States has scaled down its demands to keep talks going, along 
with the release of the North Korean money, which was tied to illicit activities and has 
minimized concerns about HEU issue and the Syria connection. With this more flexible 
policy toward the North Korean nuclear program, President Bush is likely to leave his 
successor with a more workable nuclear disablement process, rather than an overblown 
and unsettled crisis.311   
C. POLICY OPTIONS FOR SETTLEMENT THE NUCELAR CRISIS 
Which policy is the best option for achieving settlement of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis? In the current context regarding delisting North Korea from the terrorism 
list and resuming disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, North 
Korea now faces a strategic choice about its future. If the North chooses to pursue nuclear 
weapons, it will be opposed not only by the United States, but also China, Japan, South 
Korea, and Russia, as it was in 2006 after the explosive test. However, if Pyongyang 
chooses to clearly fulfill its pledge to “commit to abandoning all nuclear weapons and 
existing nuclear programs,”312 this course will allow North Korea to achieve a secure 
relationship with the United States and its neighbors. All efforts to eliminate North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons should focus on the fact that the regime in North Korea is the 
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most secretive and isolated on earth, and intelligence is often not complete. Therefore, we 
must take a look at “what we have achieved and learned thus far through the six-party 
framework, and how much more could still be possible.”313     
1. Enhance Diplomatic Tactics 
The Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea, since North Korea’s 
explosives test in 2006, adopted diplomatic tactics to seek a peaceful elimination of North 
Korea’s decades-long nuclear weapons program. President Bush’s revised diplomatic 
tactics have had some success and have proven to, perhaps, be the best way to achieve the 
goal of verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. 
North Korea’s nuclear declaration and the demolition of the cooling tower at 
Yongbyon are significant milestones in the effort by the United States and the world to 
denuclearize one of the world’s most dangerous regimes. North Korea is no longer 
freezing its plutonium nuclear facility at Yongbyon, as it did during the Clinton 
administration, but rather it is disabling it for complete abandonment while U.S. 
inspectors monitor this process on the ground in Yongbyon.314 But unfortunately, North 
Korea has already developed and tested a nuclear weapon.     
At this time, Washington should enhance its diplomatic approach to yield greater 
payoffs in nuclear talks with Pyongyang and strive to avoid reacting under pressure from 
Pyongyang, such as what happened during the Taepodang missile and nuclear explosive 
tests in 2006 and most recently by its barring of inspectors from the Yongbyon facilities 
and its threaten to resume production of weapons-grade plutonium. As long as the United 
States remains North Korea’s foe, North Korea feels insecure and will continue to pursue 
nuclear weapons and missiles to deter that threat. Even if this perspective seems far from 
certain, the only reliable path for creating mutual credibility between the United States 
and DPRK is by faithfully moving through a series of reciprocal and diplomatic steps. 
                                                 




The Bush administration has been successful in preventing North Korea from 
further production of weapons-grade plutonium under the Six-Party agreement of 2007. If 
the United States wants to give North Korea a higher stake in complying with the 
agreement, an enhanced diplomatic approach is needed, including a fundamentally new 
political, economic, and strategic relationship with North Korea.315              
2. Pursue a Plutonium-First Policy 
The central issue that has emerged in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue 
is whether to focus first on an already-existent plutonium program that has produced 
fissile material between 46 and 64 kilograms316 or to address both the known plutonium 
program and a suspected program for HEU, about which little is known.317  The United 
States should prioritize its dealing with the more real and tangible threat posed by the 
extant stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium. 
North Korea’s plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon are being disabled by 
international effort now. If the disablement is extensive and thorough, the next step 
would be to dismantle the Yongbyon facilities and eliminate its plutonium stock. This 
step would mean no more nuclear bombs and less likelihood of nuclear proliferation.318 
This is a good opportunity to eliminate the immediate threat of North Korea’s nuclear 
arsenal before it is expanded and more tests are conducted to perfect its nuclear weapon 
design. After the dismantlement success, the policy should focus on the HEU issue and 
Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation policies. 
However, dismantlement of the North Korean plutonium program was postponed 
by the United States to resolve the North Korean HEU issue, the North Korean-Syrian 
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connection, and the terrorist sponsor list issue. Taking a hard stance again by walking 
away from the talks or allowing North Korea to slowly disable its plutonium program 
would now be fruitless. Instead, in the Bush administration’s remaining months and the 
new U.S. administration’s initial months, the United States must focus on eliminating 
North Korea’s plutonium production capabilities. Only after the termination of this real 
and immediate risk from Pyongyang, and by building trust through gradual and mutual 
concessions, can the United States handle concerns such as resolving the question of 
uranium enrichment, getting answers about the Syria connection, achieving stability and 
peace in Northeast Asia, as well as normalization of relations between the two countries. 
3. Enhance the Six-Party Talks Framework 
The current political environment among the Six-Party Talks partners has been 
uncertain because of several factors: North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s health problem; 
the new South Korean administration’s hard-line policy toward North Korea; the 
unsolved abductees issue between Japan and North Korea; and disagreement between the 
United States and Japan regarding delisting North Korea from the U.S. terrorist sponsors 
list.   
In light of these circumstances, it is clear that a diplomatic option through the Six-
Party Talks framework is the only workable choice at present. The objective toward the 
North Korean nuclear issue is clearly to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the 
associated program, while simultaneously eliminating a threat to the international 
community. However, this objective will take time to achieve. As long as the current 
regime in Pyongyang continues to rule North Korea, the Six-Party Talks partners look 
upon Pyongyang’s commitment to giving up its nuclear weapons with skepticism. 
Patience from all partners will be critical. 
From the perspective of the North Korean leadership, security guarantees should 
be assured by not only the United States but the other four countries as well and include 
the following comprehensive approaches: a promise that the United States will not 
unilaterally use a military option to attack North Korea; real efforts to normalize  
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diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea and between Japan and 
North Korea; measures to improve economic and energy assistance; and joint efforts to 
secure a permanently peaceful Korean Peninsula.  
Even if North Korea attempts to slow the process of denuclearization with various 
excuses, delaying measures, and attempts to entirely roll back what has been done, 
Tanaka argues that there are two reasons for continuing the diplomatic option through the 
enhanced Six-Party Talks framework.319 First, there is no other reasonable option for 
freezing North Korean nuclear weapons. Second, a diplomatic process could yield 
payoffs in consideration of North Korea’s circumstances in the future. North Korea’s 
national power is continually declining as result of its economic difficulties, and the 
Pyongyang regime will not be able to survive without foreign assistance. Additionally, 
whether or not rumors about Kim Jong Il’s illness are true, the regime remains uncertain 
and cannot sustain itself forever.320  
The international community should recognize that a diplomatic approach to 
North Korea will not produce success without a mixture of “dialogue and pressure.”321 
Toward this objective, it is essential that the five Six-Party Talks partners make more 
enhanced and united efforts. In the long term, the Six-Party Talks framework could serve 
the goal of full denuclearization of North Korea. Furthermore, it could play an important 
role in producing permanent cooperation among the six nations.322 
4. Apply the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Model to North 
Korea 
Early in the Obama administration, Washington should be expected to make a 
high-level statement that the United States is ready to normalize relations with the DPRK 
and sign a peace treaty to end the Korean War along with elimination of North Korea’s 
nuclear and dismantlement of its nuclear facilities. 
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To clearly achieve North Korea’s denuclearization and settlement of the problem 
on the Korean Peninsula, cooperative threat reduction (CTR) should be a significant part 
of this effort, along the lines of U.S. programs to deal with WMD in the former Soviet 
Union, plus other options. It is a favorable time for international society to develop and 
apply a North Korean Threat Reduction (NKTR) program because the G-8 countries seek 
to spend $20 billion on such efforts by 2011; U.S. legislation approved spending of threat 
reduction funds outside the former Soviet states,323 and Obama’s Korean policy team is 
also interested in developing a program for the DPRK similar to the CTR program.324  
In terms of objectives and performance of CTR-type programs, the United States 
recognized that former Soviet states’ uncontrolled strategic weapons marked a 
considerable threat by early 1991.325 Cosponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and 
Dick Lugar (R-IN) in 1991, CTR programs were established by the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 1991, which set forth the following objectives.326 
• Reducing the risk that WMD might end up in the hand of sub-national 
groups  
• Preventing the spread of these weapons to new countries 
• Supplementing verification regimes by bolstering transparency 
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The United States cooperates with the former Soviet states to eliminate strategic 
weapons and delivery systems and is currently investing an estimated $1.5 billion in 
FY2008, combining funds managed by the Department of State, Energy, and Defense. 
Other countries also involved, included the European Union, Japan, and Canada.327  
The results of CTR programs have been successful. As of September 2008, 7,292 
nuclear warheads have been removed from military stockpiles, more than 496 long-range 
missile silos have been eliminated, and over 1,400 strategic missiles and strategic 
bombers have been destroyed.328 Furthermore, CTR programs have provided over 50,000 
nuclear weapons scientists with civilian research work and with jobs that allow for the 
improvement of the economies of their countries.329 
Recently, these programs have been applied to the non-former Soviet states to 
eliminate chemical weapons in Libya, as well as to convert the Libyan IRT nuclear 
research reactors for the use only with low-enriched, non-weapon-grade fuel. Also, 
Libyan nuclear scientists are receiving support.330  
The denuclearization of North Korea is likely to involve thousands of people, 
including employing scientists, and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Without outside 
assistance, these tasks may be beyond North Korea’s technical and economic capacities. 
Thus, a multilateral effort with Six-Party Talks partners will allow political and financial 
burden-sharing so that a NKTR program in the DPRK could achieve its long-awaited 
objective. Additionally, participants with different skills and resources would be 
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Russia have shared previous experience and the technical skills to carry out these 
programs. But, China, Japan, and South Korea’s contribution in the CTR program will be 
indispensible in getting the job done.331 
Even though North Korea would seem to be reluctant to abandon its nuclear 
weapon program as long as it has hostile relations with the United States and also 
remains the world’s most secretive states, North Korea will commit to dismantling parts 
or its entire nuclear program through multilateral and integrated CTR programs that 
might provide North Korea with political, economic, and security benefits. 
A CTR program that included a verification regime for a non-nuclear Korean 
Peninsula requires a mechanism for enlisting North Korea’s full cooperation in order to 
produce success. In this sense, politically, there will have to be a six-nation declaration of 
peaceful coexistence, bilateral talks (US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK) to normalize relations, 
and North Korean participation in international conferences and institutions.332 In the 
security approach to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program, U.S. and international 
security guarantees, bilateral and multilateral military security seminars and exercises, 
and reciprocal adjustments of military forces on the Korean Peninsula will be required. 
Additionally, in terms of proposals, it requires including international consortia and other 
investments in industries and in infrastructure, as well as assistance to the development of 
commercially competitive enterprises and establishment of modern financial and 
budgetary systems.333              
The Six-Party Talks framework represents the initiation of a program aimed at 
building trust. A NKTR program would significantly contribute toward the creation of 
nuclear-free and peaceful Korean Peninsula.    
A NKTR program could be established with the following specific features. 
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• The participants would be the United States, ROK, Japan, China, and 
Russia 
• G-8 members and ROK would mainly provide funding for all of NKTR 
program-related activities 
• This program would initially eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons, 
weapon-grade plutonium stockpile and long-range missiles, along with the 
IAEA’s non-proliferation activities 
• It would develop the necessary nuclear safety infrastructure, including 
regulations and inspection capabilities, site safeguards, and security 
programs in North Korea 
• It would proceed with military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), 
which are already identified in the Basic Agreement of 1991 between the 
two Koreas. Specific examples would be as follows. 
• Establishment of “mutual DMZ monitoring”334 by representatives 
of a NKTR program in order to have an early-warning system for 
the movement and enforcement of both sides’ troops 
• Participation in international military seminars and conferences 
• Reestablishment of a South-North military hotline. 
• The sharing of information regarding military maneuvers 
• The DPRK would receive political and economic incentives, such as 
diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan, a security 
guarantee from the United States, foreign investment to overcome 
economic difficulties, and energy and food assistance 
Verification of North Korea’s nuclear program is centered on the current impasse 
between the United States and DPRK. In consideration of a NKTR program, a new 
approach to verification, involving five Six-Party Talks members will be required for 
overcoming the deadlock of North Korean nuclear problems. According to John Olsen of 
Sandia National Laboratories “a regional verification regime” 335  for a nuclear-free 
Korean Peninsula will contribute to not only eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons  
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program, but also preventing a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. It could emphasize 
nuclear issues as well as missiles and conventional forces. This regional regime could 
address South Korean, Japanese, Chinese and U.S. Security concerns.336  
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V. CONCLUSION  
A. SUMMARY OF BOTH COUNTRIES’ INTERACTIONS 
North Korea has a unique historical and cultural background and has continuously 
faced an unfavorable external environment, economic failure, and insecurity. The DPRK 
has pursued a nuclear weapon program both as a security mechanism and as a diplomatic 
tool to help overcome its economic difficulties. While bilateral negotiations and 
agreements contributed to the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in the first and 
second nuclear crises, the nuclear material stockpile of North Korea is believed to have 
grown.       
North Korean nuclear policy has been to seek nuclear weapons as the best 
bargaining mechanism to solve threats posed by the United States and to extract 
concessions from the United States and its allies. Obviously, Kim Jong Il possesses 
enough nuclear material for additional nuclear weapons tests. Even so, he continues to 
pursue negotiations with Washington because the regime does not want greater isolation 
and a worsened relationship with the United States. 
Pyongyang may face future limits on use of its trademark negotiation strategy of 
brinkmanship. During the second nuclear crisis, North Korea dealt with U.S. approaches 
by supporting its own economic interests instead of unilateralism and brinkmanship. This 
shows that the North Korean strategy has changed from traditional brinkmanship, crisis 
diplomacy, ideology and guerilla tactics toward the United States to more pragmatic 
approaches. Examples would include freezing the Yongbyon plutonium program after the 
2007 Six-Party Talks, providing nuclear activities information to Chinese officials in 
Beijing on June 26, 2008, and blowing up the Yongbyon cooling tower on June 27, 2008. 
These events signal the limits on North Korea’s brinkmanship and may represent a 
change to a more cooperative nuclear policy.        
When it comes to U.S. responses to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, these were 
a mixture of deterrence and engagement to achieve its goal of denuclearization in North 
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Korea. During the first nuclear crisis, initially, the Clinton administration used coercive 
and aggressive approaches.  However, as the situation escalated, Washington decided to 
reciprocally engage with Pyongyang to resolve the crisis and modify North Korea’s bad 
behavior.  
 By contrast, during the Bush administration period, the United States attempted 
to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and change the Pyongyang regime by 
adopting a hard-line approach. But, the long deadlock between the two sides resulted in a 
gloomier situation toward non-proliferation in North Korea. After North Korea’s 
explosive test in October 2006, the United States engaged again and reached an 
agreement with North Korea in the Six-Party Talks framework in 2007.  
U.S. reactions in nuclear talks with the DPRK have mainly been shaped by the 
internal and external contexts that have been faced, such as changes in politics and 
personnel, and perceptions of the effectiveness of U.S. policy. In sum, the United States 
approached the nuclear dilemma over North Korea’s nuclear programs initially with a 
hawkish attitude, but eventually recognized the enduring policy difficulties of dealing 
with the DPRK by adopting a more cooperative approach.   
B. ARGUMENTS FOR AN IMPROVED POLICY OPTION 
As this author argued earlier, North Korea may show more predictable behavior 
in the nuclear talks and be open to eliminating its nuclear weapons and facilities, if its 
political and economic demands are met. The United States currently shows more 
flexibility and uses a multilateral framework to handle the North Korean nuclear problem. 
In the political context of the North Korean nuclear issue, all Six-Party Talks 
members should consider how they could utilize a cooperative threat reduction-type 
program in the DPRK. These discussions could eventually develop into a North Korea 
Threat Reduction (NKTR) program that would peacefully eliminate and convert critical 
parts of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and infrastructure into peaceful use. The best 
opportunity for successful denuclearization in North Korea involves CTR-type programs 
that provide political and economic incentives including a regime security guarantee and 
more energy and food aid for Pyongyang to comply.  
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The elimination of the North Korea nuclear threats will require a series of 
diplomatic agreements that lead to the building of common ground for denuclearization 
in North Korea, which may stretch out over the next decade at a high cost.337  
In terms of theoretical issues, the neo-realist approach helps to explain the 
motivation behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Thus, North Korea’s nuclear 
developments can be explained by the security model and defensive realism during the 
Cold War and immediately thereafter. As this author discussed in regard to North Korean 
nuclear policy-related theories earlier, the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons not only 
to enhance its security, but also for leverage in the service of its bargaining strategy: 
“proliferation through negotiation.” As time has passed, North Korea’s theoretical 
paradigm regarding nuclear weapons has changed from neo-realism and defensive 
realism toward neo-liberal engagement with the United States and its Northeast Asian 
neighbors due to its continued economic difficulties and the problems posed by its 
political isolation from the international community.         
If North Korea’s demands related nuclear problem were to be met, the Pyongyang 
regime would likely show good faith and eliminate its nuclear weapons. In this sense, an 
integrated and multilateral NKTR program could address the interests of North Korea as 
well as all of contributors in those activities.  
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